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· INTHODUCTION 
The advers e eff ec t upon employrnen·::, security reserve s in Massa-
chusett s of a r e cession i n 1949 and early 1950 has caused great concern. 
The b alc,nc e in the Unemploy'!nent Compensat..Lon Fund i n Massachusett s had 
dwindled so low t . at contribcltion r ates have been hiked to the maximuin 2 . ?% 
for all enployers . Even wit.h cont rib t i on rates at a rna..'Cimum , the (f; as sa-
chuseC. t:.s Unemployment Compensation Fund is st ill in such poor condition that 
another sudden r e ce s3ion would prec:..p::..tate collapse of the ent l re empl oy-ment 
secu.rHy syster:J and ring abo ut the need for assistance at the national 
l evel. 
The ob jective of this pa1Jer is t o show that three factor s , e _LJeri-
ence rating , the str·lc tu.re of ii1dustr-; , and indust rial practice s in Massa-
chu et t s v'fere b i:>. s ic to i,he cris::..s J..n 1949 and 1950 of C.he Massachuset t s 
Unempl oymen-t, Co::1,?ensation Fund . The cu.rrent. crisis in Massachusetts has 
reopened the ar gument s for and against experience r ,1tin..; that v,ere s e t f orth 
lf')-20 years a;o by ec:momis ts , uni on official s and leg_~sl ators . 
Expe rience rating , which vms adopted in .Ma.ssachus ett s in 1942, is 
not .:m Americ.;;,n idea . It '.·vas used i n Gr eat Britain and also in Germ<'my . 
However , neither cou· t r y looked favor"'bl ;T upon it c.nd a.bol .L shed .from t.heir 
Unemployment Compensat..i..on Laws . 
I n this count r y some form of exper ience ra.tinE; i s in effect in 
e very stu.te , and the pl ight of the Massachusetts Fund cannot thus be 
attributed excl usively to this type o.f taxing provision. On the other an~ , 
the precise experience r;;::.tin~ formul a empl oyed i n Massachusett s has obvi -
ously led to average tax rates that are dal!;-_serously close t o the bo r der line 
!bet ween adequ'-'-CY and inade uacy. 
The structure of industry and i ndustrial practices in ?-r.assaclusetts 
have vml;.=,:hed heavily on the Unemployment Compensation Fund . ;since World 
War I /.:as sachusett s manufact uring i ndu strie s have l ost employment mo e 
rar-i::ll j· th:;.n the rest of the cou:r+........... J ob rotation, a me thod of work 
I spreadi ng , is a direct result of t he loss in em1Jloyment i 1 manufacturing 
indust rie s~ This practi ce of job ro tation , which insures an adequ'"'"t.e labor 
supply when needed , has also pl aced a b urden upon the Unemployment Campen-
sation Fund . The presence of a l arge percentage of women in the Massachu-
setts labo r forc e w!tich causes a great deal of l abor t urnove r has also 
pl aced a drain on the Fund. .,11 the se f acto r s i n combination wit exper-
i ence ratin~ h2-ve pl ..1ced the ;,n:assachusetts tJnemiJloyment Compensat lon Fund in 
.i.t s present precar ou.s condit :i.on . 
The body of the thesis will co nt-ain a chapter dealing with the 
background of unempl oyment compensation and ex.pe rience rating both here and 
a road . Chapt er II vrill p esent the pros ar d cons of experience r a ting . 
This will be f ollowed by a chapt er expl .Lning Ct.nd comp.).ring the dL f e r ent 
experience r a ting f ormul ae stres sing specificall y t he one i n u s e in Hassa-
chusetts . Chapter IV vrill deal ~"Hh +'h.3 finCJ.oci.<J.1 status of the ~Aassachu-
.,ett s Unemployrnent Com~_ ensation Fund , and this will be followed by sumnary 
and co. elusions to b e found i n the last chapter. 
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GRAFTER I 
HrSTORY OF UN~fPLOYH~Nr INSURANCE Al D M:GRIT RATING 
Merit rating as a rider t o unemployment insura.nce laws has been 
tested by (' eat Britain , Ge rmu.ny , and other i1,'uropean cm.mtries. According 
to European exl)e rience, merit ro.ting has been found t o be unsuccessful and 
abolished from their Unem.vl oymen t Insurance Laws. l n the United "States 
ex_f:'er ience with Workmen 1 s Compensati~n h'-s been basic to many of the feat,llre s 
incoqJorat ed i n merit ratlne; pL .. ns and to much of the reasonin~ behind them. 
T.~erit r .... tinz has been incorpor ated in the unem1Jl oyment Ins ranee Laws of 
e-very state in the Uni ted States and has as its antecedeni'.s .t!:uropean expe r i-
ence a~1d Vv'orkrne11 1 s Compens'"'tion . 
Unemplo;yment Insurance in Great: Britain 
Of the several systems of compuL,ory i nsure:..nce, that of Great 
Britain has been in effect longest and best lends itself to an exposition a 
some of the pr:)bl ems connected with th..i.s type of legislat ion . 
The National Insurance Act (1911) made insurance against un~ihploy-
ment compulsor.J in 7 of the more unstabl e industries; in 1916 it was applied 
to a num er of o t.hers concerned d irectly or ind:Lrectly Y.tith r.mnitions work; 
in 1920 it was so extended a s to apply to c...ll lmportant. vrage-ecJ.rnin.; groups 
c .• ce 1)t agricultural lC.I.borers, domestic servant.s, and public empl oyees ; in 
1936 it was extended t o cover the first of t.hese e: .ce1jt.ed groups. This 
brought 13 million workers witrin -'c.. he e mbrace of the Law. 
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Under British Law each Yio rker between the close of cor.1;ml sory 
school attendanc 2.~e ( now f oLlr teen ) and b5 years of age, i n .:m insurable 
trade, is i nsured against unempl oyment . The cost is cov red by equal contri-
i bLltion s y emplo~re:r , the ins urcd. ;ot...;r'l ~he exche uer . The contributions b 
I I empl oyer and his i nsured employee a re made t rour;h stamp s purcha sed and 
affixed wee l y by the empl o,rer t o the i nsured 's unempl oyment insur~nce card, 
whi ch is surrender ed to the v;or ker when he is l ifid off o r discharged or when 
he quits. As a condition of securing benefit, t he V·Jorke r depo ·it.s his card 
I wHh a l c:bo_ exchan::;e c..nd a.J:"'plies fo r a job. If a suitabl e jo1) dot! s no t 
I 
ays , t:.he worker egi ns to :1 raw out-of -wor · ' pre s ent ltsel f >V-.i thin 3 wo rkin:; 
I henefits and continues t o do so until he can be _t-lrov:;.ded with :m it~ le 
I er11pl o e11t or unti l his i.nsur .... nce r i5 l · expires , this provided that the 
idl eness is due to lack of work ra·C-her than to di:sinclind.tlOn to work , 
' disabili ty , discharGe for cause , str:!__ke or l ockout. 
T e Act of 1 920 · e rmi tted "ins ur<:mc· J industr-y, " i. e . , through 
a se arate fund . This would, of course, r eL,t e contribution ,md de(_!;ret:: of 
risk in t he i ndustry . The lJl an.:::; submitted by onl y 2 industrie s ( bankin.:,; a rold 
i nsurance) , hoth with li ttl e une:-n-n1 ,., ,.,...~:1t , v. ere ap)roved . The fewness of 
the e_'CSJt . .i.ons pt::rmi":-ted was due cbi,_fly to the .f c.. ct thd.t it woul d havG been 
t e industri e s with the lea st r isl of unempl oyment t r.a t ·would most li~~ely 
c..ve taken e:, dvai ta;;e of the p r ov .i.sion of t he lo.w _, 3. nd thi s was r eg;...rded c... s 
undesirabl e when rnpre s s i on was conti nuin1: and the insur~nce fund wa s 
inadel uai:,e to pay the benef.~ ts promi sed. The 0 overnment theref ore gave 
notice that no extension :Jf t he pri nciple of insura.nce by i ndust ry would be 
'=-===---~====~==~--======================================~==~~=== 
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approved a s lon~ as the emergen cy situation existed, and later (1927) 
abolishe d the right of an i ndustry to establish a separate f und. Hence, a s 
t he system de'Ploped , the flat-rate cont ribu.tion was exacted i n all case s 
( ex c ept for d:~st.i.nctions between men o.nd women and betvmen ..... dult s and bo s 
and gi r l s) , withYJ.t r egard to unempl o;:nncnt experi ence.l 
Bxperience Rating in Germany 
Rate differentiation i n the Jerman unempl oyment insu.r c. nce system 
never passed tl.G stage of preliJTd.nary di 3cussion. The pr oposed forms of 
experience ro.tin g and t he ob jections against di sturbing t he r u.C.e structure 
are ne vertheless relevant to t he pr oblems raised by experience r ating in t hi s 
countrJ . 
Pr.Jposals for geographical , CJccupational, or i ndustrial rate 
diffe r entiat i on h;;we been based in Germo.riy on the cont ention tha t c. uniform 
contribution rate is i nequit abl e , ina smuch <JS the ri sk of unemployment 
varies widely among different group s of i nsured person s. There i s c.lso 
evidence t1o.t the g JVe rnment hoped to avoid subsidizing the fund from tax 
mone~:r by making each segment of the covered ri sk bear the entire cost of 
benef its p2.1id to its own wor kers. Stabili :.:.at..i..on of emj_Jl oyment hc..s played a 
mi nor rol e in German discussions of e x pe r J..ence rating. 11. commiss.i.on of 
1. The above md. terial concerning unempl oyment compensation in Great Britain 
comes from: 
Mary B Gilson, · Unemployment I nsuran ce In Great Britain (19 Jl), Pp 272-
282 N. Y.: I ndustrial Rel ations Counselors. 
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inqui ry found that one r e aso n for t he e stablishment of experi ence r at i ng 
rni 3ht be "to gi'vie a more compact circle of employer s and -workers a d i r ect 
int e r e st i n r educing unemployment by means of the nat ure of t he cont ributi on 
rate, 11 so " all occupational gr oup s would try to a scertain t he spe ci::ll u.nem-
fll oyment risk att aching to t he occupat.Lon , and t hen ende avor t o mi nimi ze t hh 
r isk . nl Li ttl e at tent ion, howev er, was ]_)aid to t his justificat~on fo r r ate 
diffe r enti ..... tion , and other con3iderations f o rce d a very careful examination 
of al t ernative means of experi ence rating . 
As a conce ssion t ~J t h e sp irit of l oc al autonomy, the first Ge r man 
Unemployment Insuranc e Law, pa.ssed in 19 27 , o. u:thorized rate different i a tL:m 
.y geo6r a+•hi cal districts. The scheme wa s soon found to be unworkable , be-
cau s e wor ke rs and employers in some areas would have been f or ced t o pay 
impossibl y hi gh contribut ion rat.es. I n 1930 , f or exam1Jl e , a contr i but i on of 
12% of ..:pay r olls wou.l d have been allocated bet we en worke rs and empl oy ers i n 
East Prussia if t h e,; had been required t o p<:1y the ent ire cost of benefits in 
t hat dist rict. 2 
An emerge ncy decree permitting occ;1pational r a t e dif fe r entia tion 
wa s promul gat ed i n l9JO. The i mpracticabili ty of thi s s cheme be co.me evident 
a t once . The r isk of une, .pl c-·yment by occapation could not be pr e c .i. sel-
measu r ed , becau se stc1t i s t i c s vrere not a vailable and no a cc ep t able 
l. Great Britain Ministry of L2.bour, Unemployment Pro bl em i n Germany , Trans 
lation of t he Re i-1ort of an Advisory Cmmnission Appointedby the Federal 
Gover runent;-1ondon : H M ;Stationery Office, 193 2 P. 12. - --
2. Mollie Carroll , Unemployment Insurance In Germa ny , Wash. j D. C., The 
Brooking s I nstitu t ion, 1930 , Pp 48-SJ. 
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occupat iona cl a ssif icat ion coul d b e d.Srised . Neverthel ess , i t wa s certain 
I tha t some occupat ional groups woul d be lurdened w..i.. th an intol erabl e cantri-
l bution r at e i f the pl an f or oc cupati onal ex1Jer ience rat ing wer e car r i ed 
t hrough . Buildi ng tra de smen , f or exampl e , would have pai d about three time s 
t he n.Jnnal rate. Finally , investiGa··:,J.on showed that the r elative occctpa-
tional ri sk s of unemployment v aried widel y from year to year . Co al miners 
were cited a s a group wi t h a very low r isk of unempl oyment i n 1930 , but bJ 
1931 the i r rat e of unempl oyment vra s ext remel y hif.?;h . 'r he admini st rators of 
the s.; stem believed t hat an~f r a t e diff eren t iation would have undermined t he 
1 finance s of t he plan . 
Thus, as i n Gr ea t Br i tain , t he i mperative need f or t he maxim1 m 
financial s trengt h precluded rat e di ff e r entiation of &~y variet; in German. , 
and since 1930 ex~erience rat ing has no t been an i s sue t here . An analysis of 
t he nature and volume of unemplo;ymen t i n t he Uni ted St at e s woul d show t hat 
thi s count ry f a ces the same probl em <) f £-'8 rsistent lurd- co r e and unpredict-
able cyclical unempl oyment tha.t has forced European unemployment insurance 
pl ars t o rel y upon nat ion-wide .t;ool ed funds wit h uniform contribut ion rat es 
for ill employers. 
Workmen 's Compensation 
I- eri t rating has alVvays been a f ev.t ur e of the Workmen 1 s Compensation 
Laws. The 1Jhilo sophy of Workmen ' s Compensation i s based on the t heor y t hat 
I ndustri al Rel ations Counselors, i nc., of New York , An Historical Ba.sis 
for Unempl oyment I n surance, Uni v. of Minn. Press, Minnesota, 1934, 
Pp 29-35 . 
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the worlcer should be compensated for any accident that occurs while he is at 
work . Another theory upon which "Norkmen 1 s Compensation is based is liability 
without fault. Under modern industrial conditions, i t is frequently diffi-
cult t o determine responsibility for a ccident s. Ther efore, it is not in 
harmony wi th j ustice to pl ct ce the b rden upon the worker and prevent him 
from receivina cornpensation f or the injury tha t he h<-.1S suffered. 
I n o rder that empl oyees or their dependen s may be reasonabl y cer-
tain of sec..1rinJ; compensation in the e vent of an accident, it is compulsory 
for employers t o carry compensation insuranc:... in a state insurance fund , or 
in a mut ual or stock insurance company, or to request permission from the 
administ rators of the compensation L.1.W to carry their own risks . A combina-
tion of these methods may be u seo. 
·within the manual classif ication of rates ; which is a method of 
gr:JU~)ing all risks of the same type , e . g . an industry, sub:industry, e tc; 
there is a merit rating feat..1re which seeks to distinguish between plants in 
the same grou so tha.t the beti:,er risks pc:.y less than average r ates , and t.he 
poorer more . The merit rating feature is a means of s timul ating accident 
prevention b,- rewarding those firms with favorable experiences. One t~;-pe of 
merit ... atin;:;: in 1JJ"orkmen ' s Com1-)ensation is experience rating. It is founded 
on the actual accident experience of t:.he individual establishment over a 
period of time. It can be ap~lied to all industries . An individual ri sk i s 
rewarded "IV i th a l ower rate, or penal1.~ed by a higher one , in accordance wi t h 
t.he deviation of his experi ence from the average of the roup to whlch he 
belongs . 
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The reader will soon see from discuss i ons below t hat many of the 
f ec.. t ures ol' the Workmen 's Corruensation Law and much of the reasoning behi nd 
t e Law have been incorporated in the merit r ating f eat ure s of t he unemploy-
ment i nsurance syst em. 
Unemployment Insu~ in '.h sconsin 
The f irst American l aw on unemployment compensation was passed by 
the iHi sconsin Legislatu.re . VH s consin had been a leade r in the movement for 
indus t r ::.al accident compensation , and experi ence in this fie l d had exerci sed 
a marked influence on s t lldents of _unempl oyment compensa tio n. An llnempl oy-
ment i nsurance bill, wr i t ten by Prof e ssor J ohn R Commons, was int rodu.ced in 
the 'St at e S8 nate by :Senator Huber on Febr al~.f 4, 1 9 21. The bill ;rovided f o 
unempl oyment i nsurc...nc e that was to be handl ed mainl y by an empl oyer s 1 mutual 
empl oJ.TTnen t insurance company with payments to be made by employers alone a..'1d 
administ ration to be simila r to t hat of Wo r kmen' s Compensation i n many 
states ; the empl oyment i nsurance company was autho r iz ed t o classi f y the sub-
ject indust ries i nto proper cla sses f or unemployment compen sation insurance 
purpo s e s t o i nspec t unempl oyment corn_r.Jensati. on risks and to appl y t hereto an 
experience rat ing system . Pr of esso r Commons said of the me asur e that it 
n star t s on t he i dea t hat t he modern business man i s t he only person who is 
in the s t rategi c po s i tion ahd has the managerial abil i t y capable of prevent -
. l t ul lng unemp oy1nen • 
1. J. R. Commons, "Unemployment; Compensat ion c...nd Preven t ion ," Survey, 
1/ol. l.r7, Oc t ober l, 1921, P. 8. 
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The "ti l l was £'<otVored by the 'St at e Fc:deration of Labor bu.t was 
stronzl y opposed l1'J l:.he ·wi sconsi n ~·.fanufa.cturers 1 Assoc iation. It was 
amended several times i n 19 21 and -presented in rn.odi fied f or:n in the State 
'Senate in 1923 but c..gain f ail erl of enac t ment. In 1925 'Senc:.tor Heck int.ro-
duced a ;>roposal simil ar t o t he Hube r bill of 1923; in 1927 Assembl yman 
Col eman sponsored a measure like the b ill of 1925; an d in 1929 Assembl yman 
, ixon introuuced a me asure whi ch embodied .featur e s of sever al of the earl ier 
, 
b i ll s . ~~o acti.on was taken on any of the s e pr01)o s als.-'-
In 193:'- Prof e ssor Comrn.o-n e> ~· ..... ted t hat he favored the set t i ng u.p of 
employer resc;rve.s to prov ide benefi t s for unemployment oc curing in i ndi vi -
dual est abl ishments as against the s-y-st em of experien ce r a ting by classe s of 
industri es that he had f ormerly advocated , and the origi nal Commons or Huber 
bi l was recast al ong t hese line s. T e new measure , who se pri ncipal author 
was Assi sta11t l~rofes.:Jor Paul A. RausbenbJ.sh of the Lini ·versity of Yhscon sin , 
was S~)on sored by Herr esent a t i ve Hi:l.rold Gr ove s, also of t he ·Jniversi ty 
faculty , and became known as the Gr ove s bi l l . It differ ed from its pr e-
decessor s in that (1) it pr ovide d for empl oyer re s er ve s by i ndi vi dual 
es t abli shmen ts a s again s t r e se r ve s by claa ses of industrie s, and (2) it 
made t he liabil i t y o.r each employer proportional t o t he l ength of time dur-
i ne which an employee had worked for him a s compared with t he requiremen t i n 
the earl i e r p roposal that t he l ast employer be liabl e f o r the ent ire be11efit 
l. 3ryce M Stewart, Plannin .~ anc1 Arl-~ - .istration of Unemployment Compen sa-
t';ion in the iJnited St a t e s , I ndustr i al Relations Counsel ors, N. Y., 
l9Jtf,"'Pp28"-29 . 
ll 
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po.yme t. The Groves bill ms l at er r ecommended by a l egisl ative inte ··im 
C')mmitt. ee on uner:~p1oytnent i n t he s peci al session o f 1931-19 32 and Y<ith 
several ;_cmendrrtents was passed in J anuary , 1932. The Act was to take e f ee t 
July 1, 1 933, but a ill ·igned on June 2, 1933, po st1Joned its o11er a tion 
until Jul" l , 1934.1 
Actual merit rating , by means of which certain employers tlal ified 
for l ov.·er contri ution rate s, fi rst became e ffective i:1 Wisconsin a t the 
e ginning of 1938 . Merit rating c:.dj ::;ts e a ch em · loyer' s premium r a te to the 
unempl oyment risk in his business. There are 2 ma j or r easons f or set t i ng 
differential p remium 1· a tes on t his basis. 5Qch differentials provide a new 
and concrete fi nc.ncial i ncent ive to mana.gement to prevent unempl oyment 
, wher ever possibl e . Rite Vd.riations also recogn ~ z e unave>idable unc111.r;:l oytr..ent 
as a social cost, connect ed with the em1jl o~rs r 1 s busines ·3, a:1d a ssess a 
!neasu:-ab e _t)ortion of that co st (nd.mel y , bene fL::.s aid ) agai nst the 
employer . 
Concerninc; the earl y results of merit rating a s a plied t o the 
ex1Jer lence i '1 wis consin Dr. Cba rle s ~~ . ~.fyers s aid : 
11 ~er:L t ratin ::; hegan t. here (in ·wis consi n ) in 1938--three or 
.four year s before the e ff ective date in most states . Nearly two-
thir ds of t he 24 7 empl oyers i nc c;rvl ewed have been encour a.ged by t h 
.:Jrospect of a reduced conLri utlon r a.t e to do somet hin:; tov,ard 
stabilizing em.iJloym2nt, c.l th ugh onl y a mino rit' have m with rel 
··tive succe ss. On the ocher hand , the drive 11 to keep dovm enefit' 
l. ibid , P. 29. 
2. R. L. Hibbard , "Result.s of Experience Rating in \h sconsin 11 , The American 
La o~ Legislation Review, Vol. 29 No. 4i December, 1939 P. 161 
- --~====~=-o=-=~~-==================~=== ====-c= 
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has led to the use of device s ( such as extr eme wo r k s}Jreadi n ~ ) 
which n:.erely avoid benefit pa;y1o.en ts and do not stabil iz e employ-
ment. Factors aff ec t ing the abili t y to stabil ize vary et>een 
industri s and between firms in the same industrial clas3i.l'icat .ion , 
and this is often as important as the de t ermination to stabi lize i 
expl a.ining an employer ' s benef it experience . 11le·..rerthel ess, the 
fac t that Wisconsin e; mployers a s a whol e a}lpear to favor their 
pre sent t ype of law may expl ain the widespread initial ef.for-c.-s to 
provi de steadier work . ul _ 
Thus we see that a l thop::-h .. ,.,-,e stE>,bilization had been ct ccorr.pl ished 
by meri t a-ting under the ·wisconsin Act, the Act tended to sti:ib ll. ze u_nder-
e :nplo:rment. and had added someY<hat to the vol ume of total unempl oyment. 
Legislative eff ort s f o r unempl oyment compensat ion have lagged be-
hind the volunt<-J.ry effort s of employers, tr<ide-unions , and employers and 
em layees acting jointly. Following the depre ssion of 1914-15, the first 
attempt to obtai n an ·u.nemplo;yrr,ent compensation l aw_ was made i n the Jni ted 
States, when a bill was introd..1ced in the Massachuset ts l egisld.t ure i n 1916. 
Th e bill w-as model ed on the Brltish Act of 1911 in th:J.t it required contri-
but i•ns froi!l em lc)yee s, employers, c...n d the ;St~~te government , but even a t this 
earlydate prepar::..tion was ru .... de for the e<;,.rly devel opments by reL ... tinr; contri-
b u.tion s and benefits to wages. No & ction was taken and it was not until the 
de1)ression of 1920 -22 that once more unempl oyment compensation bills w.ere 
1. Charles A. Myers, Ph. D., "Empl oyment Stabilization and the '.'ilsconsi n 
Ac t", JIJnerican Economic Revi ew, Vol. 29, No . 4, December , 1939 , 
P. 708 
lJ 
introduced in the st,o.te legislature of Connecticut, Massa chusett s, Minnesota 
New York, Pennsylvania , and Wisconsin . Only one of the s e , the bill i ntro-
d c1ced in New York in 1921, fol b'md the 1916 Massachuset.ts bill. The other s 
11Nere ;nodeled <.:cfter the Huber bill, dr afted by Professor John R. Common s of 
the Univers ity of Vli sconsin and f i rst introduced in the Wiscon sin legidatur 
in 1921. The bill ap_t)1• · ed all the principles of Ame r ican experi ence with 
Workmen 1 s Compensation to the relief of unemployment. The cost was to be 
borne entirely by the employer , in order to f orce him to stabilize his 
emplo;ylllent. The insurdnce w.;~. s t o be carried with a mutual company under the 
cont-rol of a compensation insurCJ.nce board which was to classify indu stries 
acco rding to their risk. I n modified forms the bill wc..s introduced at every 
:neeting of the Wisconsin legislature unt il an unemployment compensa tJ i on 
bill was finally passed. l 
The pri ncipal and most effective argument accounting for failure o 
the state bills was that if one state were t o pass a l aw, the empl o ·. er s of 
that state would be placed a t a competitive disadvantage with empl oyers of a 
state not covered by such a law. To r emove this obstacl e it was ne cessary 
that the Federal Government t ake a.ction in passing laws. This finally 
occured January 17, 19.35 when Senator \!Vagner d.nd Congressman Lewi~ intra-
duced their economic securit y bill. The ta.M-offset method, providing fo r a 
Federal tax l evied on payrolls of all employers and a credit up to 90% of th 
t ax allowed for contributions _.aid by emplo~.Jer s into a state unemployment 
compensation :fJ.und~, w"'" s f inall y incorl_D:'a ted i n the unemplo;yment compensati on 
1. "Unemployment Com_tJen sation- -What and Why?" U. :S. 3ocial '§ecuri ty Poard 
Publication No . l • 21-22 Wash . D C 1.2.3 S vt . PrintinP" Office 
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provisions . It would not set up a Federal system of unem.f)loyment compensatior 
Jut would make it possibl e for the states to pass laws vrith complete freedom. 
)n August 14, 1935 the Pr~sident approved the Social Security Act which be-
~ame effective at once. 1 
Merit rat ing was endorsed in principle by President Roosevelt in hi 
. I 
nessage t. r ansmi tting r e commendations for legislation on economic securi t 7 to 
vhe Congress. In this message (J~nuary 17, 1935) he said: 
11 An employment com1Jensation system should be constructed in 
such a way as to afford every practicable a id and incentive towc..rd 
the larger purpose of employment stabilization in order to en-
courage the st~bilization of private employment. Federal l egisla-
tion should not foreclose the st ..... tes fro m esto.bllshing mea.ns for 
inducing industries to afford an even greater stc;.bilization of 
emplo:y'IDent. 11 
The :SOcial Security bill, as r eported by the Committee on Ways and 
Jiean s i n April, 1935, and as passed by the House of Represent<.Ltives, would 
1ot have permitted any merit rating in s t ate unemplo}~ent compensation laws. 
rhe bill a s finally passed by Congr ess, however, contained authoriz~tion for 
~eri t rating. 
I n reporting out an amendment to the Hou se bill in this regard, the 
penate Committee on Findnce stated; 
11 As we deem it desirable to JDermit the sta tJes freedom of choicE 
in this re spect, we also believe that the Federal law should pro-
vide for ~ecognition of credits allowed by the states to employers 
who have regularized their employ'IDent . All unemployment cannot be 
prevented by many employers , but many employers can do much more 
than they have done in tJhe past to r egularize employment. " 
The laws of all state s contain merit r ating provision s which per-
~it rates below the usual standard of 2.7%, on the basis of experience with 
1 ·j hi.rl D ;:>c; 
unemployment a s mea s ured by a fd ctor or factors spe c i fied i n the laws. ThesE 
reduced r ates under state laws would be meaningless, ho·wever, unles s they 
were reco gnized and allowed as additional credit against the Federal unem-
ploy~ent tax. The Federal tax does grant additional credits to employers 
who pay r educed r ates under a state law, provided the state law meets certair 
Feder al stc:1.ndi:1rds and ha s been so cer tif ied by the :s:ocial Security Admini strc:r-
t ion. I n order that employers may qualify for additional cred i t allowance 
with re spe ct to a reduced rate of contribution permitted by a stat e law, t he 
state law must provide a s follows in ca se s of pooled funds, as in Mass-
achuse t t s: 
No reduced r at.e of contri butions t o a pooled fund or t o a 
partially pooled account i s per mitted to a person (or group of 
per sons) having individuals i n his (or their) employ except on 
the ba s i s of his ( or their) experience with re spect to unemploy-
ment or other factors bearing a direct relat ion to unemployment 
r i sk during not l e ss than the three conse cutive years i mmediately 
preceding the computation date. 1 
Massachusett s Legislative Background 
The first enactment of the Mas sachusett s Unemployment Compensation 
Law in 1935 provided i n part as follows: 
'Section (4). The commission shall , for the year 1941, and for eacr 
calend~r year ther eafter, cla ssify employers in accord~ce with their actual 
experience in the payment of contributions on their own behalf and with 
re spect to benefit s charged against their accounts, with a view to fixing 
such contribution r at e s as will reflect such experience . The co~~ission 8all 
l. Hou se No . 2175 
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determine the contribution r ate of each empl oyer in accordance with s uch 
rul e s and regulations as the general court may prescribe. 
Section (5). The co~mission shall i nves tiga te and report upon the 
approximate degr ee of unemplo~~ent hazard in the various industri e s, occupa- I 
tions and employments and their cost to the fund. I t shall recommend to 
empl o;)rers, i n industrie s, occupat ions or employments sh owing an ex cessive 
cost to the fund, measur e s for sta bil i zing empl oyment therein. It shall 
also , i f it deems necessa r y , recommend to the ge neral court a hi gher rate of 
contribution s f or any cla ssification of industries, occupations or employ-
ments i n which unemployment is excessive or chronic. 
A brief review of the adminis trative recommendations and the 
recormnendation of the then Qovernor and of the legi slative s itua tion 
i mnedi atel y prior to the enactment of merit rating provisions as contained 
i n Chapter 490 of the Ac ts of 1939 is in order as indicative of t he several 
viewpoi nt s and of the legislative intent at tha t time. 
On July 31, 1 939, Governor Sal ton stall forw."'rded to the General 
Court a com:nynication from J. Edward Doyle, the then Dire c t or of Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commission, a s to a proposed system of merit r a ting.l 
Thi s me ssage also referred to Hou se, No. 1 641 of 1939 , accompanying petition 
of :t!:dward F . Connelly on behalf of the .As so ciated Industries of Massachusett1: 
Mr . Doyle' s communication referred to the lack of progress in Congressional 
pro cedure a s to a plan for a state meri t rating ( providing for a uniform re-
duced rate to all employers in the s tate under certai n prescribed condi tions) 
l. House . No . 2314 
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which plan wa s then pending in Congre ss, spon sored by the Adv i sory Council 
and by the Governor and advocated by Congressman John W. McCo rmack . In 
pl ace of the plan for a state meri t r ating s ystem, a different rating pl an 
subst antially as subsequently enacted i n Chapter 490 of the Act s of 1939 
(appr oved Augu st 12, 1939 ) was preposed by Gover nor :Sal tonstall. 
This enactment of 1939 with certain later amendments (having to do 
principally with questions of t ransference of merit ratin g from predecessor 
to successor employing units) is now substantially as contained in :Section 
141 of the employment securit y l aw. 
I n the corununication of Director Doyle, which was tr&n smi tted by 
Governor 'Sd.l tonstall to the General Court, the following points were s tressec 
in fav or of the propo s ed merit rating l egisldtion: 
l. As of July 1, 1939, the s t ate un employment trust fund app r oxi-
mated $61,000,000. 
2. In 1938, $28 ,000, 000 had been paid in benefits a s ~ainst 
contributions of $34, ooo,ooo . 
3. The pur pose of merit rating was to encourage stabilization of 
employment. 
4. I n no case would the employers' contri bution rate a s proposed 
be over 2. 7~'& and not less t han • 5% . 
1. See appendix . 
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S. I t is es t imated t.hat t he 1:rropo sed merit-rating plan >till, v1i th 
experience, pe rmit the contributions to be approximv.tel • t.he 
yearl y expenditures , t ereby preventing fur ther i..l.C cumul ..... tion 
in i[ashington. 
6. The proposed pl an was not ideal , but ·was i n keeping wi th the 
type of plan permitted under provisions of Federal l aw. 
~~c: ritr""ting , al though enacted in 1939, became operative , in so 
far as r educed r : tes to empl oyers were actually in effect, as of 
Jm uary l , 1942 . 
I n the following chapters I shall explain the different experi ence 
r ating pl an s and attempt t o show that merit rating has not been a s at i s f ac-
t ory device in Massachusetts . 
I 
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CHAPTER II 
\ 
PRo·s AND CONS OF EXPERIENCE RATING1 
Meri t, or experience , r ating continues t o be one of the mo st 
. hotl y debated aspects of unempl oyment compensation. The heat is in great 
i 
j part cau sed by t he fact that the o~~Jonents and proponent s of diff e r enti a 
I ratir g t al k a t cross purposes . One group evaluate s experlence r ating on the 
I bas i s of i t3 effects on individuals e,11pl oyed y specif.Lc employers ; the other 
I evalu ate3 experience r ating on the basis of its ef fect s. on tre whol e l abor 
I marke t. Tho se who ~. dvo cate 8X!-ie rience rating v iew it as a logical part of a 
I 
sel f-cont d.i nor1 insurance sy::=;t e:n , just a s variable rat e s are a commonl y 
accepted fea t ure of 'No r km.en ' s cor"~"""' '"'" ... ,ion . Those wl:to oppose 
1--
' L 
I 
The leading arguments f or and against experience ratin~ have been dra~n 
from the following sour ces among others : Abr aham :"'iegel , "E.xperience 
Rating Under State Unempl oyment I nsurance. Laws Duri ng 1948 , u ~So cial Sec-
uri t y Bulle t in, Vol. 12 No . 3 (r!Iarch , 1949 ) , Pp 3-ll ; John Ede l man, - -
11The New Proposals for Unemployment Com1)ensation, 11 American Economic 
"Securi t y , Vol. 6 No . J (April.:..May, 1949) , Pp 12, 15; Cl air Yfilcox , 11Meri 
Rating in :Stat e Unempl oyment Compensation La.w s," Ameri can Economic Revie1· 
(June , 1937), Pp 253-259; Berman Feldman and Donald M. Smith , The Ca se 
for Experience Rat ing in Unempl oyment Compen s a_tion , New York ; I ndu stri al 
Relations Coun selors, tl9J9 ), P 6, 8-9; Richard A Le s t er and Charl es V. 
Kidd , The Case Aga.i nst Experience R~ ting in Unemplo;yment Compen sat ion , 
Nevr York : Industrial Rel ations Counsel ors , (1939), P. 29; Richard A. 
Lest er , "Further Remarks on Meri t Rating," merican Federationist, 
Vol. 46 No . 5 (May, 1939) , Pp l-l-96-500; 'Nill iam Haber and J. J . Jo s eph , 
"Unemployment Compensation , 11 Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and 'Social cience , (}A arch, 1 939 ), P-.-2b;Clemen s J. France ,-"Basic 
Fall acies in Merit Rating, 11 ..:o cial Se-euri ty in t he United State s , Ameri -
can Association of :S Jc i al Securi ty, I nc ., NewYork, (1941), Pp 60 - 71; 
Cha rle s V. Kidd , "The I s 3ue of Merit Ra.ting in Unemploymen t Insuran ce," 
Soci al Se curity i n the United Stat e s , American Association of .SO c ial 
:Security, I nc., New Yor k , (1940), Pp 56-62. 
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experience rating feel that the financial features of a sound unemployment 
insurance system cannot be patterned after private casualty insurance. I 
propose to review these issue s briefly and to examine the present status of 
experience rating in unemplo~)'ment compensation. Because it ls impos sible to 
dis cuss experience rating without pl o. cing it within the fNmework of t he 
whole program, I shall first out line the major objectives of unemployment 
insuro.nce dnd the s cope of such a program and disc us s employers' merit 
r ating within this framework. 
MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF UNEMPLOYMENT I NSURANCE 
I n my opinion the major items whi ch should be included in a plan 
for a compr ehensive system of unemployment compensation are the following: 
1. Cove~ for All Workers 
A complete and adequate system should be des igned to i ncl ude 
all gainful workers. It should i ncL1de not only employers of one or more 
workers in private business enterprise but agricultural workers; dome stic 
servant s; employee s of charitable, rel igi ous and educational institut ions; 
governmental emplo?ee s; maritimeworkers, and interstate migratory workers. 
2. Economic and Social Objectives 
Having determined the coverage we should next consider the 
different cause s of unemployment and seek to determine the scope of the 
system in relation thereto. The major causes of unemployment in the United 
.States are: (a) "ll:he pe r iodic expansion and contraction of the general econom~ 
oi:,herwise known as t he business cycle or the general economic cycle; (b) The 
expansion and contr actio n of industr1 and normal labor turnover (frictional) 
(c) Industry and l abor mi gration; (d) Technological improvements; 
21 
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I (e) The rLse of new industries; (f) Seasonal variations , and ( g) struc-
tural change s in the national economy. 
PRESENT PROGRAM I~ LTI~ITED 
The present system of unemployment ins Llran ce appears to be 
primc..rily designed to take care of f rictional unemplo yment and to some 
extent seasonal unemplo;yment. However , the present s ::rstem is not des igned tc 
meet mass unempl o•nnent due to major or minor business cycles or s tructural 
changes in our national economy and it i s wholly inadequate to cope with 
technological unemployment. 
Considerable t h ought should be given to the part unemployment 
compensation might play upon the impact of the next majo r depre s s ion. We 
all realize that at the end of the p resent expansion of busine s s we will 
undoubtedly be confronted with a national depression and mass unemployment a 
least as severe as the depression of the 1930' s.l No matter how great t he 
reserves accumul ated ( and under the pr e sent system i t is difficult to see 
how they will be great) to meet the im. act of that depression, they will be 
Ll seless unless the pi pe-line running from the insur ance reservoir is of 
sufficient capacity to chd.nnelize out the funds qLlickly into the pockets of 
unempl oyed workers. 
THE EXISTING :SY.STEM: IGNORES SOCIAL ADEqUACY 
3. Social Adequacy 
Adequate social protection should be the chief objective of any 
sy s tem of social insurance. In our ~rstem we must ask ourselves whether it 
1. The downturn in 1 949 before the stimulus of r earmament due to the Commu-
nist scare and the Korean War s hould attest to this statement. 
I' 
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is wise to base unemployment compensation strictly on what might be termed 
riva.te insurance princ..i..ples , i. e., should the benefit formulae be based 
holly on wage s earned p reviously; should the benefit rate be based wholly on 
the concept of the full-t ime weekly wage; should duration of benefits be 
a sed enti r el y upon earnings in the base period? Instead of these restrictiv 
rivat,e principles, should we not give consideration to r elating the benefit 
structure to the concept of S...'lcial Adequacy and need '? In case of mass 
nemployment due to a nati onal depression, should we not extend t:.he duration 
f benefits up to 30 weeks or mo re i n case or need? In this wa"r we vvoul d 
create a device for drawing out money from the reservoir quickly and .placing 
it in the pockets of the unemployed. Only thus would we be building a 
"first line of defense " in a real s enee, si.nce we would create purchasing 
power in the first year of a major or minor depre ssion . The s ame provisions 
could ap;>ly to men who lost their employment becaus e of technological im-
, rovements because it i s well known that it takes six months or a year for a 
an Virho has spent a large part of his life in one occ~.lpation to become 
djusted to a new one • 
.EXPERI EI\JCE RATING BA'SED ON BEL IEF UNE!v1PLOYME tiJT LS PRKv:i1Nr ABLE 
Now that I have set forth the major objectives and scop e of a 
comprehensive, socially adequate system of unemployment compensation, I can 
examine employers 1 experience rating within that framework. "lhat is 
experience rat ing? To understand the question it is necessary to examine 
the two major schools of thought regardi ng the basic objectives of 
nempl oyment compensation. The first school holds that, the primary objective 
f such a system should be the creation of a system of social insurance to 
protect the unempl oyed. They contend t hat one of the chief hazards of 
economic l ife in a system of free competitive enter prise--unempl oyment --
should be provided against like the hazards of fire, accident and deat h, whic 
are all i nev .it able , fortuitous and unpredictable. The second s chool of thowgl' 
P.old s that the fundamental objective of unemp;L oyment compensation should be t)l 
~chieve regular employment in industry a nd the r eby prevent unemployment . I n 
:::onsequence , the advocate s of this ob jective believe that payment of benefits 
·n a sy s tem of unempl oyment compensation i s secondary t o the broader social 
3.nd economic ob j ect ive of pr eventing unemployment. Thus the firs t school of 
c.houoht bel ieve s tha.t unempl oyment is to a very lfi.rge d§gr ee beyond the 
::: ontrol of the i ndividual empl oyer or any group of employers. The second 
school reache s a directl y opposite conclus ion--that employment and unemploy-
nent are to a very l a r ge degree within the control of t he indivi dual employer 
Employers ' merit r ati ng plans are based on the. l atter principle. 
rhe basic idea is to use the power of t Ct.xation to c:. chieve the socially desir-
fibl e resul t of reducing or eliminating unemplo;rment. This i s termed 
'incentive taxation , 11 which i s by no means a new concept. The funddmental 
pasis of al l forms of i ncentive taxation revol ve s around the idea of "rewards' 
md "penalties". Fo r example, in unemplo;yment compensation, i ncentive taxa tid 
muld be designed to reward by a low tax those employers vrho were able, 
hrough a better business system, to r egc1l arize their empl oyment and p revent 
abor tur nove r, thereby decreas ing unemplo :J'men::.. Cont r a , t he emplo :! er who did 
ot s :; st ematize his busine s s and who had a high labor turnover would be 
penalized b-,c a hic:he r tax . 
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Thus a genuine merit rating sy stem would measure the exact degree 
of reg-u.lar emplo;<_,rment achieved by a given employer as a result · of the 
incentive tax. For example, a genuine s.:/ stem of merit rating would classify 
all employers according to the i nherent stability or instability of a 
particular industry. It is well known, for example, that public utilities 
with a virtual monopoly in a given community for furnishing light and power, 
gas or telephone are the least susceptible to fluctuations in the business 
economy. Consequently, public utilities have a high degree of employment 
stability. A genuine merit rciting system would, therefore, not rew"'" rd a 
public utility by a lower tax rate except insofar as the pllblic utility 
demonstrated that it had brought about; a regularity of employment ov er and 
above its natural and inherent norm or degree of stability. 
At the other extreme, we find the construction industr-y, with its 
highly unstable employment due to factors over which the members of the 
construction industry have litt le or no control. Therefore, a genuine 
employers' merit rating system woald not penalize the contructi :)n indllstry 
because of its high degree of instability b ~t vvould set for that industry 
a norm of stability or instability. I n case an i ndividual firm of the 
i ndustry was able to regularize its employment so that the amount of its 
employ111ent was greater t han that of the industry a s a who1e: , i ~ would be 
rewarded by a lower rate, and vice-versa. 
Although such a consideration is obviously fundamental for the 
purpose of merit rating, no · merit rating s stem existent i n the United 
:states takes into account the degree of control which the individua l employer 
has over the v olume of emplo;yment or unemployment. .All merit r ating 
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systems, particularl y tho se adopted under pooled-fund laws, give the lowest 
rate to naturally stable industries, i r r espective of any efforts to give 
mo re regular emplo:;nnent. They impo se the highe st rates on industries by 
nature unstable, irrespective of any achievement s made in g iving more 
regular employment . 
I NDLVIDUAL VALUE OF REGULARIZAl'IO!~ NOT ~UESTIONED 
The feasibility and desirability of employment regularization 
continue to be important iss ues in the experience rating controversy. By 
regula.ci zation I mean the provision of steadier employment and income to 
individual workers rather than stabil i zation of the total vol ume of work 
offe r ed , since the former variety of stability is that which is most often 
discussed in connection with merit rating. With respect to the feasibility 
of reducing irregularity of empl()yment in individual plants, it cannot be 
denied that a monetary incentive offered to employers will induce a l imi ted 
amount of regul ariz ation. The fact that not all employers have foll owed the 
lead of progr e ssive compo.nies in minimizing employment fluct uations is 
self -evident. However, thro-..tgh devices which have been thoroughly and 
carefully analyzed, the l imited group of employers who can reduce to a 
limited degree fluctuations in both the number of different workers on their 
payrolls and the total number of man-hours of employment offered can 
probably be extended. 
It is undoubtedly also true that tangible advantages accrue to 
individual employers and emplo yees when emplo~rrnent is regularized . . Regular-
ization of workers' incomes allows more economic budgeting of expenditure s. 
Removal of the fear of dismissal lifts a weight from the minds of workers 
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and in all pro .ability increases p roduct i v ity . To t he employer, regul a rized 
employment nee e3sit ates closer control over hiring pol i cy , with a consequent 
i ncre a se in the quality of the working force. Steady employment engenders 
loy al t v to t he firm and make s the retention of key workers less of a 
problem. Finally , long years of l ar ge-scale unemploymen t have made the 
public appre ciative of employers' efforts to r educe the u..nemployment , or t he 
irregularit y of inco-:ne , of their wo r kers. Indeed, the value of regularized 
empl oyment to those directl y benefiti ng i s such that one may wonder why an 
incentive tax is r equir ed to bring about regularization . 
UNEMPLOYMENT LARGELY BEYOND CONTROL OF INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYER , 
The "j:,heory t hat an i ndiv idual employer can stabilize his employ -
ment and thereby prevent unempl oyment a ssumes that employment and unemploy-
ment are phenomena wi thin the cont rol of the i ndividual employer. But while 
a small amount of employment may be within the control of the individual 
employer , the great volume of unemployment, both i n times of pr osperity and 
particul arl y i n periods of depression, i s obviously beyond his control. It 
ce:etainly cannot be cont ended that t echnological unemployment resul t ing from 
i.nvent ion and improved machinery is vvithi n t he control of any individual 
employer . I t cannot be a r gued that mas s unemployment due to major or minor 
depressions can be controlled by the individ1 al empl oyer. That the causes of 
unemplo~nent are nume rous and varied seem obvious. Some are the inevitable 
result of the t ype of business in which an employer is engag ed . As pointed 
out before, publ i c ut ilit ies have fairl y regular and stable employment in 
good and bad times . The con st r uction indust~J, on the other hand , is subj ect 
to forces entirely beyond the control of the i ndi vidual employer, such as 
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federal and state appropriations, climatic conditions and geographical 
location. 
MERIT RATING A DEVICE FOR "Ll!:rTING OTHER FZLLOW PAY". 
Vfuen presented with conclusive evidence that unemployment in our 
economic system is largely beyond the control of the individual employer and 
th.~t he can, therefore, do l ittle to stabilize employment, the advocates of 
merit rating make what is cc.lled in the armed forces "an about face. 11 They 
admit that unemploy~ent is largely beyond the control of the individual 
employer and then argue that the unstable industries should, in all equity 
and fairness, bear the financial burden of the unemployment which occurs in 
their industries. They argue, for example, that the three great groups of 
industry which are most unstable in character--mining, manufact uring, and 
constuction--should bear the greater burden of the cost of unemployment 
insurance . This idea they call "the allocation of the social cost. 11 The 
end result according to this contention, is that mining, manufacturing and 
construction would, generally speaking, never get a tax rate below 2. 7% oi 
the payroll and generally would get a tax rate of 2. 7% or over. On the othe 
hand, such industries as public utilities, the newspaper p 1~blishers, the 
bankers and financial institutions, and probably the ma.jori ty of retail 
establishments, would get a rate below 2.7%. 
11 Thus we would behold the advocates of employers' experience 
rating starting out like Knights of the Round Table, all in 
shining armor, with a fervor and faith that they are in sight of 
the Holy Grail! The holy grail of these modern 'merit rdting' 
knights is to give regula r employment and so prevent the dire 
catcistrophe and hazards of unempl oyment. But it turns out to be 
a Will-o'-The-Wisp. They have to admit in the end that this great 
social objective--the prevention of unemployment through 
2u 
'incentive t e:.xation' --i s unattainable to any marked degree. With 
the Knights of Merit R~ting losing s ight of the great social 
objective--prevention of umemployment by incentive taxation--the 
ent ire que stion de,s enerates into a controve r sy with the slogan 
'Let the Other Fellow Pay. ' nl 
This is a "horse of a d i fferent colorl 11 Yes ! A hor se of an 
entirely diffe r ent breed. For we no longer talk of stabilizing or prevent-
ing unemplo yment by incentive t axation. We talk about who shall pay the 
cost of insurance against unemployment which cannot be controlled in any 
signifi cant degree by any effort whatsoever of the indivi dual employ er. It 
be comes now an i ~3 sue of the allocation of Social Cost, a matter of fiscal 
policy--and a very important matter of fiscal policy it is. 
·who shouts "Let the Other Fellow Pay?" Those industries, of 
course, which are by their na ture not subj ect to a high labor turnover, not 
subject to seasonal va riations, not subject to r apid change in con sumer 
habits , such as, for exampl e , the ut ilities which have been granted a 
mono poly, the publishers of great newspapers or per.:._odicals, the banks, 
insura nce companies, to a large extent retail trade and also certain large 
manufactu ring trusts or cartels which have elimina ted compet i t ion and do 
not ope rate i n a highl y competitiv e market. 
MERIT RATING IDEA INHERITED FROM AN EARLIER ECONOMY ' 
The original concept of merit rating as a f orm of incentive taxa-
tion to induce regular employment had its birth many years before our nation ] 
economy became · as dynamic and, in consequence, a s highly unstable as it i 
1. Social 5ecuri ty in t he United States, 1941, American Association for 
Social Security,-rnc., New York, 1 941 , P. 65 
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today. Thirty years ago our pr oblem of unemployment was mainly that of 
seasonal workers. As soon , as . ~ we consideranational system today which in-
cludes all gainful workers, the utter impracticability of employers' 
experience rating becomes apjJarent. This is true not only of industry but 
even more so of other groups. Think, for example, of attempting to apply 
ariable rates to all the housewives employing domestic servants, to the 
of thousands of farmers employing one or more agricul tural workers, 
hose work is so highly seasonal, and to the millions of industrial workers 
and farm laborers migrating from state to state. Yet , except for the great 
administ rative difficulties, there is no reason today why the foregoing 
classes of workers should not be included j_n a system of unemployment 
ompensation . It i s worth noting that during the past fifteen years or so a 
reat amount of technological unemployment has occurred in this country in 
onnection with farm labor, and there is promise of a great deal more in the 
ear future. 
1 MERIT RATING RAI5ES ~ FUNDAMENTAL FISCAl. QUESTION 
There is a fundamental question of fiscal policy involved in the 
ontroversy concer ning merit rating. Under the existing provision s of the 
tate laws, especially in Massachusetts , there is a serious question whether 
ariable tax rates will give as much in contributions as a uniform rate of 
• 7%. This is an important question of fiscal policy because a yield of at 
2.7% is necessary if we are to have a comprehensive and socially ade-
system of unemployment compensation. Kxperience rating should not be 
sed as a device for an over-all tax reduction. That is a perversion of its 
hief objective, viz., stabilization of employment , It is almost certain, 
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~owever, that if a number of employers are to get a zero rate or a rate of 
.5%, yiel ds equal t o 2. 7% will nece ssitate increasing t he tax on employers 
~ith an unfavorable experience considerably above 4%. As a matter of fact, 
the "'"llocation of cost theory should, logically, require that an employer wh 
a bad experience pay a rate nece ssary to take care of :the unemployment 
occurring in h i s particul ar enterprise. Such a rate, carried to its logical 
extreme, might well be 7 or 8% in the construction i ndustry and in certain 
other capital-goods i ndustries. 
,SOCIAL VALUE OF Sl'ABlT.IZATION ,~UE'STIONAELE. 
While admitti ng the value of regula r i zed employment within indi-
vidual plants, the social value of regularized employment may be questioned. 
True , the t ask of showing that regularization of employment can be of real 
val ue to i ndividuals and at the same time an unde sirable pol icy from the 
viewpoint of the community as a whole i s difficult. For the situation here is 
analogous to the tariff controversy. Protectionists can point to factories 
which have been shut down because of ruinous fore ign competition, and foreign 
goods which presumably displace American products and hence cause unemploy-
ment can be seen on every Wool worth counter . The proponent of freer trade 
must r el y upon abstract economic principles and forego any attempt to justify 
his po sition by r eference to isolated cases. .Similarly , the opponent of ex-
perience rating must rely upon rather abstr<.i.ct principle s to demonstrate that 
the advantage s of regularization to i ndi viduals cannot be cumt lated and hence 
considered a boon to the community. 
The general economic grounds on which the soci al desirability of 
regularization can be challenged are as follows : 
(1) Regularized employment tends to create not only a group of 
regul arl y employed i ndividuals but also a group of indiv iduals who never 
have jobs. Vfi th the exi stence of mass unemployment in the 1930's, the 
social desirability of encouraging t he formation of a group .of economic 
Pariahs can be definitely questioned. I n addition to the demoralizing 
effect of l ong-continued unemployment upon those who have had jobs, we must 
reckon wit h an increase of dbout 600 , 000 to the labor force ever y year . Any 
policy which deliberately sets as a goal the reten tion of the same indi vidu 
in employment , places individual benefits above the good of the corr~unity as 
a whole. 
MA'SS UNEMPLOYMENT WILL I NCREASE . 
( 2) Regularization will tend to reduce the number of jobs. By 
I penal izing employer s where:.rer a worker draws benefits, employer s are con-
1 strained to cut working forces to a minimum and to dela:r expansion of 
employment. While such a policy may aid those who retain jobs, i t is not a 
rational labor market policy to restrain the expan sion of employment. It is 
often said that experience rating, by penalizin g expansion of employ~ent 
which cannot be maintained, will reduce cyclical fl uc tuat ions. Unfortu-
nately, no r ating formul a yet devised will distinguish between desirable and 
undesirable incree:.ses i n the number of employed workers. Heal thy as well as 
unhealthy expansion in the number of employed workers will be inhi bited. Th 
1 effects of a flat payroll t.::..x i t self upon expansion of employment are severe 
I enough wit hout adding rate differentiation . 
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AT,TAHJMENT OF TAX REDUCTION POSSIBLE WITHOUT STABJLIZATION 
(3) Any plan of experience rating offer s employers incentives to 
reduce thei r taxes regardless of their regularization of employment. :Since 
all existing rating plans are based ultimately upon the number of worke rs who 
become unemployed and draw benefit s, any device through whi ch an employer can 
dismiss workers under condition s which render them ineli gible for benefits is 
a perfectly legal means of circumventing the intent of the experi ence rating 
provi sions. Hiri ng students to cope with peak summer produc tion, engagement 
of sal e s persons through a company which continue s, for the pur po se of un-
employment compensation to be the employer, and dismissal of workers with 
meager benefit rights or pr evious l ay-off records are means by which employ-
ers md.y obta in low contribution rates wi thout stabilizing employment. Work-
spreading dovm to the point at which partial benefits become payable, a 
policy which enables employers to create an a r t ificial sort of stability 
merel y by re-ar ranging work schedules, i s a f urther device through whi ch the 
intent of the law may be l egally evaded. Dr . Charles A. Myer s f ound, in the 
course of a study of stabil i zation under the Wisconsin act, that benefit 
avoidance vdthout stabil i zati on was sometimes just as important as the de sire 
to stabilize. Wher e benef i t avoidance, which is as profitable to employer s 
as bona fide stabilization, is a ma jor effect of experience rating , further 
doubt is cast on the social desirability of rate differentiation. 
I ndeed, the more effective experience rating is i n promoting 
re gul arization , the shar per will be the undesirable effects outlined above . 
Al though the psychological effect of an anticipated tax r eduction will stimu~ 
late regul arization i n some pl ants , t here .:C. s l ittle po ssibility that 
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experience rating will result in changes in employment pN.ctices t hat will 
significantly affect large portions of the labor market in the long run. 
The i nex orabl e pressure of the business cycle will continue to force expan-
sion or contraction of incomes and jobs. Employment in producers ' goods 
industries will continue to fluctuat e more widely than employment in con-
sumer goods industries. Style, custom and weather will continue to govern 
the pattern of empl oyment in large sectors of the economy. Finally, union 
agreements, public opinion, and far-sighted personnel policy may cause the 
adoption of sounder employment practices than those which would be stimulate 
by the hope of tax reductions under experience rating. 
OIIJLY COMPLETE POOLING OF Rl'SK:S CAN MEET PROBLEMS 
Many advocates of experience r ating would say not only that 
many of the opinions expressed above are erroneous but that discussion of 
stabilization is irrelevant to expe r ience rating. It is true that the case 
for experience rating does not rest upon the desirabil ity and feasibility of 
employment regularizati on alone. In fact, during the past few years less 
emphasis has been ~laced ~pon the stabilization that will be promoted 
through experience r a ting and more upon the seeming fairness of relating 
each employer 's rate to the drain he places on the fund, regardless of his 
efforts to stabili ze . The symbol of this change in attitude is the fact tha 
rating pla11s arenow called "experience" rather than 11merit 11 rating. Existin 
schemes are more easily defended on the ground that they simply measure each 
employer's "experience" rather than his "merit," since under no law is the 
achievement of stability di rectly rewarded. However, tho se who argue that 
no employer has an equitable right to a redu ced rate because his 
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ithdrawals from the fund are low base their contention on the fact that 
nemployment is not caused by individual employers and that a flat contri-
bution r a te is t herefore more equitable than a differential rate . They also 
as sert that the risk of unemployment is so severe over the community as a 
hole that a sound financial basis for compensating unemployment can be 
established only by complete pooling of the risk. 
This i ssue involves, however, more than a mere disagreement as to 
ho cause s unemployment and how the risk should be shar ed under existing l aw . 
The pre sent state l aws e stablish self-contained insurance schemes financed, 
as in Ylorkmen 1 s compensation, by a pa;.Toll tax , and designed to disburse 
benef i ts to workers, as does workmen's compensation , on the basis of past 
earnings. As the ~,r are today, they do not repudiate the concept of gearing 
each employer's contribution rate to the benefits drawn by hi s workers. It 
is only the opponents of experience rating, convinced that the interdepend-
ence of industry is so obv-ious that any attempt to allocate responsibility to 
individual empl oyer s is futile and that the ri sk i s so severe t hat provision 
for benefits can soundly be made only by community-wide sharing of the risk, 
who are l og i cally forced to quest ion not only experience rating but the main 
bases of the present unemployment compensation system. Indeed, complete 
acceptance of the idea that unemployment is a social risk, caused neither by 
individual employers nor individual workers, casts doubt both upon experience 
rating and upon the payroll tax as a means of financing benefits as well as 
upon the strict relation to past wage s as a means of fixing benefit rights. 
P.AST CONFUSION DUE TO L ,lRGE RESERVES· 
Although both the equit f of differential rate s and regularization 
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focused more on the desirability of reducing cont r ibution rates in view of 
l a r ge re serves in many state s. The f a ct is, however, thCJ.t high reserve s in 
many st<>.te s were caused in pdrt by ve r y low stc~.ndards of benefit Jayments and 
in par t by relatively .fc.:.vo r abl e empl oyment experience . Furthermore , accumu-
l a tion . of reserve s during times o.f rel d t ively good employment may be but a 
normal and anUCipat ed r esult cf the decision to finance benef its in t ime s of 
poor employment by the a ccumul at ion of funds i n good times. Indeed, the 
entire q ~estion whethe r reserves wer e too high in some stat e s is a de~atable 
issue. There can be no doubt that the contr ibution rate necessc.1. r y to 
f i nance uniformly effective benefit standards among t he states over the 
course of the busine s s cycle will not be unifonn and that a permanent 
maladjustment of contr i bution income to benefit expenditures i s to be 
expec t ed i n some states . Certain states will probably not be able t o 
finance adequate benefits over the co urse of a complete busine ss cycle even 
if a tax above 2.7% were levied annually upon all employers. On t he other 
hand, a few stute s will be able to pr ovide adequa te benef i ts by taxing all 
employers at a uniform rate bel ow 2. 7% of pa;,crolls. Bat , because unde r the 
Social Security Act experience r ating i s the onl y method by which the se 
states can ad just t "'-x proce~ds downward , the device which was i ntended to 
allow some variation i n individual employers' contribut i on rate s has become 
the only mean s by which the average contribut ion r at e of a state as a whole 
can be adj usted . 
RATE REDUCTIONS FOR ALL EMPLOmRS COULD REPLACE 
EXPERIENCE RATING 
lJiihile individual state systems exist and while the risk of un-
employment yaries widely cLmong the states, it is oifficul t to oppose some 
means of adjusting long-run income to long~run expenditures. Provision in 
the Social 'Security Act for uniform rate reductions for all employers rather 
than for diffenential rating may offer a solution which avoids the social 
and economjc objections to experience rating. Such an amendment should make 
necessary the incorporation of reserve requirements adequate to insure future 
payments in the states where rates are to be so reduced and should add 
minimum benefit standards to the 'S·ocial Security Act. A more f a r-•sighted 
solution of the problem would be the establishment of some sort of an_ 
equalization fund by which part of the funds of states with excess reserves 
:Sbuld be transferred to states which cannot meet their benefit obligations. 
Although experience rating may berefended under the present Social 
Security Act as the only means of adjusting state incomes, a more immediate 
problem is the pressure which develops for rate reductions a a result of 
interstate competition among employers. Each state legislat:.ure is urged to 
reduce taxe s through experience rating lest neighboring states with such 
provisions deprive native employers of business and eventually cause indus-
tries to migrate. There can be no guarantee that competitive rate cutting, 
once begun, will not continue to the point where the primary function of 
unemployment compensation--the payment of benefits--is forgotten. 
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, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE :SERVES P.~S ~ BRAKE IN EMERGENCIES 
Post -war plan s cannot i gnore the outstanding contribution of a 
comprehensive and socially a dE(quate system of unemployment com~ensation on 
the first impact of a depression. It is the unanimou s opinion of everyone, 
i believe, that the first stimulus that c CJ.n be given in such a crisis is a 
quick increa se in t he nati.on' s purchasing power . A. large reserve or benefit 
payment pool under such a system could put several billion dollars into 
c irculation l ong before any program such as publ ic works, for eX::Ln.nple, could 
even get into operation. For thi s reason, I believe a well-des igned archi-
tec t tlr a l plan of unemployment compensation might well act as an initial 
stimulus to private enterprise, a tonic as it were, which might partly pre-
vent the need for costly public works. Indeed, had we had in the ten-year 
period prior to 1930 an unemployment compensation program, had we built up 
substantial reserves, I believe it would not have been necessav.'Y ei-ther for 
the states or cities to have borrowed such hu ge sums for unemployment relief. 
In t he early '30's, unemployment in the United States reached the 
astronomical f:i gur e of 16,000,000 men and women. It is not beyond the realm 
of possibil ity that \ve will huve 25, 000,000 unemployed for a considerable 
length of time at the close of the war period. Whether our economic system 
of free enterprise can stand the itr.pact of such a cata strophe is question-
able . But the unemployment insurance p rogr am is today the only lon g-range 
program which might serve ~ s an immediate brake upon a national business de-
I flation at the end of the war years. Therefore, during these years of 
prosperity evoked by vast expenditure s on national defense, we should be 
building a large reservo..i...r of billions of dollars not only to t ake eare of 
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' the unemployed b t to put 4uickly into the hands of t he nc::.tion 1 s constlmers 
the several billions of dol lars needed to stem the tide of national defla-
tion . 
I s it not obvious L1at :''"'].., ~:a objective is virtuall y impossible 
under existing fi s cal pol i cy >ihich , because of expe rience rating, permi t s . a 
system of variabl e tax r ate s i n the states--each state dlffer.ing from the 
others? 
GROWING FRICTION'S IN THE :SYSTEM 
There is growing opinion th;... t unemployment compensation is today 
in somev1hat the same · osit ·on a s an i nd i vidual who has pneumonia . It is 
appr oachint; the crisis which may determine whether the system as it now 
exists can survive. Growing friction s within the system s.re , in part , the 
cause of the pr eoent mal ady . Powerful groups of employers are seeking to 
use experience ratin.; as a device for an over-a.l l tax reduction. Large 
l <:~.bor organizations arc beco:ning increasincl.:r dissatisfie d with this device . 
The "Social .Securi t y Boar d and the state .J. dmln.:C. :;;tr __._ tors are beginning to eel 
I 
1 
the pre ssures of these confl icting group s . Ther e is also a l arge bloc in 
Congr e s s wh · ch feels that the sy:"+"""' ~-z: unem_;:)loyment compen sation i s due for 
a com1)rehen si ve overhauline; . 
Of utmost s ignificance i s the fact that we ha.ve , a· parentl y , no 
f ederal pol icy on tl e role which a comprehensive arid so cially adequate 
system of une·npl Jyme t com pen sa t ion can play at the end of the jJre sent 
defense program, in order to meet t he impact of national defl ation and mass 
unemployment. Here and there in the states there appears to be some 
~-
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co .lpr~.;hen sion of what a l c..r ge and SJ. b s t ant ial r eserve can do in the ev ent of 
ma s s unempl oyment in the post-war period. Above all , t he r e i s no real ly 
i ntelligent appr oach t o t he basi c question of fi scal policy . ? ur ther more , 
we seem to be postponi ng indefinitel y t, he ext ension of coverage t o l arge 
groups of worke rs at pr e sent excl uded f r om the benefits of unempl oJrment 
in s u.ra.nce . 
Thi s unfortunate s .;,.tuat lon exists at the vei:y time when unempl oy-
men t i n surance i n the United 3 t at.e s sho-u.ld be viewed a s on2 of the corner-
stones in the program of soc ial se curlt~1- and in Lhe forward march of 
pro gr e ssive democracy . It i s my personal opinion that unl e s s -we talw s t eps 
in which fo r e sight is combi ned vrith::bl e pl ann i ng in t hi s particul ar fi el d , 
i we may f ind a nation- wide d i sil l u sionment concer ning tme:nployli1ent c :Jmpensa-
t i on in the post- war peri;)d . A sy st em. of unempl oymen t insur ance l i mited in 
s cope and socially i nadequat e will fail t o pl ay an impo:vt ant rol e i n the 
next na t i onal emerGency in o:~r economic Cit1d 30 cial l i f e . Ii su ch be the 
case , can we def end it agai nst a t. t a ck? 
CONCLUSION 
There seems to be lit t l e po ssibil i ty that the d i f fe r ence s of 
opi ni on between ad•Jocates and op1Jonents of expe r ience rat i ng will be re-
solved by di sctlssion. Loe;ical a r guments pr oceedi ng fro m a ssumption s which 
one school of thought t hinks and feel s t o be r ealisti c ar e not onl y irrele-
van t, but exasper c1. t in;; , to theopposin~ s chool , ·whi ch cons i de rs t he same 
a s surrr t i ons to be anti so c ial and a r tif icial. Ls with most i ssues invol vi ng 
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legislative ac tion , the reld.t.ive strength of interested groups rather than 
tho l ogic _.nd subtlety of their rationa l izat i ons will probabl y del:.er:nine the 
fate of ex)erience r at ing . If, a s hc...s been true in most stal:.es, gr::mps 
interested in the establishment of adequate benefit standards fai l to pre ss 
their case, the continuc:Ltion of experience ra t ine; may be assured. On the 
other hand, d. weakening of the solid front wi t h which empl oyers plead for 
ex1Jerience rdting mc1y occur when some employers find that they have been 
sold a "gold brick ." Finally, the solvency of s ome state fund s ( especially 
_hssachusetts) may be threatened when d severe and relativel y lon~-enduri:.1g 
drop in employment occurs. When this happen s , no t onl y ex}lerience rat in;_; but 
the entire fin.mcial set-up of unemployrnen t compensation may have to be 
re-examined . 
CHAPTER III 
EXPERIENCE RATING PLANS 
The purpose of this chapter is t o discuss the t ype s of experic.mce 
rati ng provisions currently in use in the United States; to compare them and 
point out sorne s ho r t comi ngs , and to examine particularl y the pl an used in 
Massachusetts 
The ys tem of finan cing unde r the :St ate l c.w s is influenced by t he 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act sj_:J.C'"' ~ ., ... ~_er an approved State l aw , employers 
may credit the State contributi ons they pay tow a rd the federal J% payroll ta:x 
Any saving s on the 'State tax may a1 so be credi te.d under an approved exper-
i ence rating plan. But the total c r edit may not exceed 90% of the 37b federal 
1 tax. There is no fede ral employee t ax. 
/ Source of Funds 
Unemployment insurance 1.n all States is financed mainly by contri-
butions from subject employers on the wa;2;es of their covered worl ers; also 
two .State s collect empl oyee contribut ions . The U. S . Tr easury holds the 
funds collected f or the Stat e s in the Unemployment Trust Fund and intere st i 
cre d1.ted to the Skte accounts. lvioney i s drawn from this fund to pay bene-
fits or to ref und con~ributions erroneously paid . 
Employer contributions . --Under al State laws the standard rate of 
contribut ions is 2. 7% , except i n Mi chigan where it is J%. I ndi vidual 
euployers in all 'States pay at r e ri" ,....,.r1 r cl. tes on contribtltions under 
xperience-rating provisions described bel ow. 
Like the federal ~ax, the employers' cont rib ution is l imited to the 
irst $ 3, 000 . paid to a worker by an employer within a cal endar year. Most 
tates follow the fede ral pattern in excluding from te1.xable wages voluntary 
i @nissal payments , payments by t he employer of the employees• tax for feder-
al old-age and survivo rs insur e1.nce, and payment into certain special benefit 
unds for employees. 
There are certain interest and/or penalty payments in every Stat e 
lto which an empl oyer is subject for default or delay in payment of contri-
utions and us ually he incurs penalt i e s f or f ailure or delinquency ln maki n g 
eports. The State administ rat ive agencies also have l egal recourse in order 
t he contributions, u sually involving jeopardy assessments, lev ies, 
' udgment s, and civil su i t s. 
A r efund will be granted to employers who have ove r paid. Such re-
be made within time 1 i mits ranging from 1 to 4 years or longer. 
Ernplo;ree Contributions. --New Jersey and Al abama a re the only two 
which still collect employee contributions. In New J ersey, employee s 
p aid 1% for unemployment insurance until June 1, 1948; since then they pay 
I. 25% for unemployment insurance pur poses <1nd • 75% for disability insurance 
In Alabama the empl oyee contribution varies from .1 to 1.0% a s the 
r ate va ries from .5 to 2.7% under the State experience-rating 
The employee contribution s are deducted by the employer from the 
pay and sent with his own contribut i on to the St at:.e agency. 
of Fund 
~i s consin had the f i rst State system of unemployment insurance in 
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~his country. It set up a separate reserve for each employer. The employer•s 
contributions we r e credited t o this reserve and his employees' b enefit s we r e 
oaid from it . A majority of the States enacted 11 pooled-funtl 11 laws bas ed on 
~he idea that the risk of unemployment should be spread i:l.mong all em}ll oyers 
and that worke rs should rece ive benefit s regardl es s of the bal ance of the 
contributions pa i d by the indi vidual empl oyer and the benefit s paid to his 
workers. Now only Kentucky and No r th Carolina havte 11 r eserve-account 11 l aws and 
both laws provide for a partia l pool. 
Experience Rating 
In 1 948 Missi ss ippi finally applied an experience-rating provision 
to its unemployment insurance law; so that now all States have some system 
of experience-rating by which indillidual employers 1 contr ibution r ate s are 
varied from the standard r ate on the basis of their experience with unemploy-
f!lent r i sk. 
The first experience-rating provisions became effective in Wiscon-
sin ln Jan uary, 1938. The other States f ollowed as shovm b elow .1 
The add i tional-credit provision s of the Social Security Act , now 
the Federal Unempl oymen t Tax Act, as amended in 1939 , fanned the backgro und 
f'or the ,Stat e experience-rating provisions. The federal requirements differ 
1940--Ind., Neb. , and S. D. 1941--Ala., Calif., Conn., Hawaii, Kan., Ky., 
Minn. , N. H., Texas, Vt. , Va., and W.Va. 1942--Ariz., Ark., Colo. , Del., 
Fl a ., Ga., I owa, Mas s ., Mich., Mo ., N.J., N. M., N.D., Ohio, Okla. , :s .c~ 
and Wyo . 1943--D. C., I daho, Ill., Maine, Md., a nd N. C. 1944--Pa. and 
Tenn. 1945--La., Nev ., cJ.nd N. Y. 1 947--Alaska, Mont. , R. l. , Utah and 
Wash . 1948--Miss. 
"Comparison of :State Unemployment Laws as of Oct., 1948 11 Federal Security 
Agency , p . 12. 
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for reserve-account and pooled-fund laws. A tax payer receives additional 
credit for a lowered rate of contribution to a pooled-fund if the rates were 
based on not less than 3 years of experience with respect to unemployment or 
other factor s bearing a direct relation to unemployment r isk . 
A tax payer is allowed adJ itional credit against his federal tax 
for a reducedr.:J.te to his reserve-account if (l) contributions hcive been pay-
able to the account during th~ last 3 years, ( 2) benefits have been paycible 
from the account during the preceding year , and (3) the balance in the reserv 
equals or exceedsffive times the l argest amount of benefit payment s in any one 
oft he three calendar years preceding the date of computation and at the same 
time equals 2.5% of the aggreg~te pciyrolls of the last three years.l 
Formulae for Experience Rating2 
The experience-rating provisions of the State laws vary greatly and 
~..ohe number of variations increases with each legislative year . The differences 
~n t he formulae used for rate d etermina tions giver ise to t he mo st significant I 
pf the v e:.ria tions. The factor used to mea sure experience with unemployment i I 
1~..ohe basic variable which makes it possible to establish the relative incidence 
Ff un~mployment among the workers of different employers . Differences in s uer 
r xper,ence represent the major justification for differences in tox rates, 
I 
2. 
Fort he above information I am indebted to Mr John Powers of the Division 
of Employment Security. 
Gallagher , Rachel :S., "State Differences in Unemployment Compensation 
Employer Taxes", 'Social :Security Bulletin, Vol. 8, No . 10, October, 1945. 
Pp. 2-4. 
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either to provide an incentive for stabilization of employment or to allocate 
the cost of unemployment. At present there are five distinct sy stems--the 
oay roll decline, compensable-separations, reserve-ratio, benefit-ratio, and 
penefit-wage ratio plans. Some 'States use a combination oft he systems. 
All che plans have certain thing s in comE1on in spite of essential 
diff enences. They are all devised to establish the relative exper ience of 
indi vidual employers with unemployment or benefit costs. To this end , all 
pave factors for mea suring ea ch employer's experience with unemployment or 
penefit expenditure and all compare this experience with a measure of expo-
sure--usually payrolls--to establish the r elative experience among employers. 
I ~ovvever, t he five plans differ greatly in the construction of the formulae, 
in the factors used to measure experience, and the method of measurement, in 
~he number of years over which the experience is recorded, in presence or 
~bsence of other factors, and in the relative weight given the va rious factor~ 
~n the final as signment of rates. 
1. Payroll Variation Plan 
The payroll va riation plan, used separately or in combination 
~ ith other factors is independent of benefit payment s to individual workers ; 
reither benefit.s nor any benefit derivat ives a.re used to measure unemployment. 
~.n employer• s experience with unemployment i s measured by the decline in his 
!payrolls from year to year or from quarter to quarter. The declines are 
expressed as percentage of payrolls so that experience of employers with 
arge and small payrolls can be compared. If an employer's payroll shows no 
decrease or only a small percentage decrease over a three-year period, he 
~ill be eligi ble for the largest pr oportional reductions. 
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Alaska, Mi ssissiJ pi , and Washington Measure the stability of annual 
~ayrolls on the theory that over a period of time the greatest drains on the 
k und result from declines in general business activity. Rhode Island measure 
vhe stability of payrolls from quarter to quarter over a t hree- year period. 
rhese changes reflect not only changes in general business act ivity but also 
seasonal or irregular decl ine s in employment. Utah measures the stability 
pf both annual and quarterly payrolls and as a third factor, the duration of 
~iability for benefits, commonly called the "age " factor. Employers are 
given additional points if they have paid contributions over a pe r iod of 
years because of the unemployment which may resill t from the high busine ss 
mortality which often characterizes new busine sses. 
New 1 :)r k and :V!ontana also have 3 factors; in New York quarterly 
declines, age and a benefit-wage ratio factor; in Montana annual declines, 
age and ra tio of benefits to contributions. 
The payroll decline plans use a variety of methods for r educing 
rates. Rhode Island and Jlississ ippi have 3 alternate rate schedules, depend-
fi.ng on the reser-ve r o.tio of t he StdtE fund. Montana arrays employers in S 
plasses and assigns rates designed to yield l. 8% of payrolls. Alaska, New 
~ork, Utah , and Wa shington determine the surplus reserves, and with the 
~xception of Utah the se :Std.tes distribute the surplJ.s in the form of credit 
r.ertificates applicable to the employer's nex:t year's tax . The anount of 
each employer's credit depends on the point s assigned him on the basi s of his 
experience with the factor or fCJ.ctors u sed, his taxable payrolls, and the 
weights for the distribution of the surplus among the classes stc..ted in the 
r<-aw. These credit certificates reduce the amount rather than the r ate of his 
l 
I 
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tax; their influence on the rate depend s on the amount of his next year 's 
payroll s. 
I n Utah employers are grouped in 6 classes according to t heir 
combined experience factors, and the surplus is assigned to the first 5 
classes by arbitrary weights, multiplied by the taxable wa ge s of each 
group of employers. The surpl u s assigned to the cla ss i s subt racted from 
2.7% of the taxable wages of the class ~nd the contribution balance for the 
class is translated into a contribution rate for each class.1 
2. Compen sable-separations Formula 
Another system of merit rating is known as the compensable 
separation s formula. The empl oyer 's experience iser.:c..mined with a view to 
arriving at a merit rating index. When this has been determined , his 
relative standing in a list of all the employers 1 payrol ls will decide the 
actual r ate that i s a ssigned to him. The merit r a ting index depends upon 
2 factors : (l) the employer's t otal payroll for the l ast 3 years; (2) the 
total benefit rates of hi s separated employees for the same period . 
Any employer who has employed a separated vmrker i n any fou r 
calendar weeks in the 56 days preceding compensable unemployment will be 
charged with the weekly rate of such separated worker. I t should be noted 
that onl y one compensable separation ( therefore only one benefit rate ) may 
be charged to any employer for any one employee in any benefit year. 
An employer' s merit rating i ndex i s arrived at in the following 
way : the s um of each employer's payroll for the l a st 3 year s is divided by 
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the sum of the total unemployment benefit rates of his separated employees 
for the last 3 years. The result obtained by this division is the index. 
After the indexes have been computed for each such employer, they 
are arranged in order, proceeding from lowest to highest. This is then 
divided into 13 groups, with the same amount of payroll in each group . l 
The gro·J.p of employers with the lowest indexes continue to pay the standard 
2.7%; the next group 2.6%; the next group 2.5%; and so on down to 1.5%, at 
intervals of .1%. Thedivision into payroll groups is made in order that the 
total amount of contributions to be paid under the experience rates should 
equal the amount nece ssary to maintain the fund.2 
3. The Reserve-ratio Formula 
The first and the mo st popular of all the pl ans is the 
re serve-ratio formula of experience rating. It is now used in 27 pool ed-f 
States and 2 reserve-account States.3 South Dakota incorporate s some 
ratios in its reserve-ratio system. Regardless of the type of fund, the 
formulae are the same. The system is essentially cost accounting. On each 
empl oyer 's record i s entered the amount of his payroll, his contributions, 
and the benefit paid to his workers. The benefi ts are subtnacted from the 
contributions and the resulting balance is divided by the payroll to deter-
mine the size of the balance in terms of the potential liability for 
1. The amount of payroll in each group is arrived at by dividing the total 
of the payrolls of the .State into 13. 
2. Gallagher, Rachel 5., op. cit., p . 3 
3. Ariz., Ark., Calif., Colo., D. c., Ga., Hawaii, Idaho , Ind., Iowa, Kan., 
Ky., La., Me ., Mo., Neb., Nev. , N.H., N.J., N. M., N. C., N. D., Ohio, 
Ore., 5. C., S. D. , Tenn., W. Va., and Wise. 
"Comparison of :State Unemployment Compensation Laws as of Oct., 1948", 
========~====~~i~ 20 
benefits inherent in wage payments. The balance carried forward each year 
in the reserve-ratio plan is ordinarily the difference between the em-
player's total contributions and total benefits received by his workers 
since the law became effective. The employer mus t accumulate and maintain 
a spec ified reserve before his rate is reduced; then rates are assigned 
according to a schedule of rates for specified rantes of reserve ratios; 
the higher the ratio the lower the rate. The formula is designed to make 
sure that no employer will 1- l e granted a rate reduction unless over the 
years he contributes more t ,o t J1e fund than his employees draw in benefits. 
As the funds available for benefits have incred.sed, the rate s for a given 
reserve have been decreased, but provision has been made for higher rat es 
should the funds decrease . l 
4. The Benefit-ratio Plan 
A very few States2 have introduced the benefit-ratio ~stem, 
. 
which does not use contributions paid by the employer to the fund computing 
the experience rares, depending instead upon the employer' s total payroll 
for a specified period. But this system depends, as does the reserve-ratio 
plan, upon the amount of benefits paid, rather than upon base period wages 
of benefit claimants regardless of the amount of benefits actually paid to 
them. 
The individual employer ' s emperience is obtained by dividing the 
amount of benefits charged to each employer in a specified number of 
l, Gallagher, Rachels., op. cit. p. 2 
2. Fla. Md., Mich., Minn., Vt., Wyo. 
"Comparison of State Unemployment Compensation Laws as of Oct., 1948", 
op. ci t . p. 22 
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preceding years by his total payroll for the same years. The period used is 
usually 3 years. 
The use of a State experience fdctor is not a necessary part of 
this system. At least one of the :States (Michigan) uses a ldchedule which 
does not take state·wide experience into account. 
In another State, the benefit ratio of the employer is related to 
statewide experience in the foll-owing way: one of five schedules of rates, 
with 4ifferent high and low rates, is chosen on the basis of the ratio 
obtained by dividing the total assets of the fund by the average (l/3) of 
the t otal amount of benefits paid during the preceding 3 years. A list of 
all employers, together with their payrolls, arranged in order of their 
benefit ratios is divided into the number of rate categories specified in th 
particular schedule. 
In other States, the employer's benefit ratio is determined by 
the administrative agency. 
oenefits are charged to the employers according to the same 
general principle as under the reserve-ratio system. (see above) 
5. Benefit-w~ge Ratio Plan 
'rhe benefit-wage ratio formula which is in use in 9 :States1 , 
(including New York where it is only one factor) is radically different. 
It makes no attempt to measure all benefits paid to the workers of 
indiv~dual employer s. The relative experience of employers is measured by 
the ooparations of workers which result in benefit pa;;:rrnent s, but the duratio 
1. Ala., Del., Ill., Mass., N. Y., Okla., Pa., Texas, and Va. 
"Comparison of State Unemployment Compensation Laws as of Oct., 1948", 
~- _ ci.t _ p.._2_3 ___ _ 
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of their unemployment is not a factor. The ~parations, weighted with the 
wage earned by the w·orker with each of his employers in his ba se period, 
are recorded on each employer's experience-rating record as benefit w~ge s. 
Only one separation per beneficiary per benefit year is recorded for any one 
employer. The index which is used to estdblish the relative experience of 
employers i s the proportion of each employer's payroll which is paid to tho 
of his workers who become unemployed and receive .benefits, i. e., the pro-
p~rtion of his benefit wages to his total taxable wages. 
The formula is designed to assess va riable rates which 1till raise 
the equivalent of the total amount paid out f or benefits. The percentage 
relationship between total benefit payments and total benefit wages in the 
State during 3 years is determined. Thi s ratio, known a s "The :State Ex-
perience F a.ctor 11 , means that, on the average , the com pen sated workers 
received a certain amount of benefits f or every dollar of benefit wages and 
the same amount of taxes per dollar of benefit wages is needed to replenish 
the fund. The total amount to be raised i s di stri buted among employers in 
accordance with their benefit-wage r atios; t he higher the ratio , the higher 
the rate. 
Individual employer 's r ates are determined by multiplying the 
employer's experience f actor by the State experience f actor. The multipli-
cation is facilitated by a table1 which assi gns rates which are the same as, 
or slightly more than, the product of the employer's benefit wage ratio and 
·state factor. The range of rates is, however, limited by a minimum and a 
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maximum. The minimum and the rounding upwards of some rates tend to in-
crease the amount which would be raised if the plan were effected wmthout 
the table; the maximum, however, decreases the income from employers who 
would ot herwise have paid higher rates. 1 
Differences in Charging Methods.2 
Various methods are used to identify the employer who will be 
charged with benefits when a worker becomes unemployed and draws benefits. 
Except in the case of very temporary or partial unemployment, compensated 
unem~loyment occurs after a worker-employer relationship has been broken. 
Therefore the laws indicate in some detail which one or more of a claimant's 
former employers should be charged with his benefits. In the reserve-ratio 
qnd benefit-ratio States it is the claimants benefits which are charged; in 
the benefit-wage States, the benefit wages; in the compensable-separation 
States, the weekly benefit amount. There is no charging of benefits in the 
payroll decline systems. 
In most Btates the maximum a~ount of benefits to be charged for 
and claimant is the maximum amount to which he is eligible under the State 
law. 
1. Most Recent Employers 
In Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia 
the most recent cove~ed employer gets all the charges on the theory that he 
1. Research Institute Analysis, Sept., 1941, 11Meri t Rating", p. 28 
2. Matscheck, Walter and Atkinson, Raymond Cl of the Committee on Social 
:Security, "Problems and Procedures of Unemployment Compensation in the 
U. 5. 11 Public Administration Service No. 65, Pp. 62-69 
L 
DETERMINATION OF RATES UNDER "CLIFFE PL.P.N"l · · 
When the If the Employer 1 s Benefit-Wage 
state Experience Ratio Does Not Exceed ; Factor Is 
1% 5o% 100% lSo% 200% 25o% 300% 35o% 
2 25 so 75 100 125 1)0 175 
3 17 33 so 66 83 100 117 
4 13 25 38 so 63 75 88 
5 10 20 30 40 50 &J 70 
6 8 17 25 34 42 so 58 
7 7 14 21 29 36 43 50 
8 6 13 19 25 31 38 44 
9 6 11 16 22 28 33 39 
10 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 
11 5 9 14 18 23 27 32 
12 4 8 13 17 21 25 29 
13 4 8 12 15 19 23 27 
14 3 7 11 14 18 21 25 
15 3 7 10 13 17 20 23 
16 3 6 9 12 16 19 22 
17 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 
The Employer 1 s Contribution Rate Shall Be : 
.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3. 0% 3. 5% 
If the employer 1 s benefit-wage ratio exceeds t he 
percentage i n the last column of the table opposite the 
State experience factor, his contr ibution rate shall be 4%. 
1. Research Institute Analysis, Sept., 1941, · ~ -erit Rating · 
For elaboration on the use of this table see--:r;nedlscussion 
dealing vd th the determination of rate s in Massachusetts, 
on Pp. 67a , b , c . 
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has primary responsibility for the unemployment; in Idaho and Vermont, the 
most recent base-period employer. Of course in many cases the mo st recent 
employer and the most recent base- period employer are the same, i. e., the 
separating employer. The provision to charge the most recent base-period 
employer is based on administrative 
period employers are available when 
simplicity, in that records oft he base J · 
the determination is made, and records ol . 
post-ba'Se-period employers may not be available under current methods of 
wage reporting . Maine and New Hampshire relieve , of these charges, an 
employer who gave a worker only casual employment; in Maine, by limiting 
charges to a claimant's most recent employer who employed him for more than 
J consecutive weeks, and in New Hampshire, by designating the most recent 
employer who paid him at least $3.00 more per week than his weekly benefit . 
Connecticut, Michigan,and Wisconsin also emphasize charging recent . em-
ployers; Connecticut charges the one or two employers who employed a 
claimant 4 weeks or more in the 8 weeks before separation; in Michigan and 
Wisconsin where base-period employer s are charged in inverse chronological 
order (see below), the last base~period employer is the separating employer 
for there is no lag between the base period and the beginning of the 
benefit period. 
2. Bawe-period Employers in Inverse Chronological Order 
Eleven States1 limit charge s to base-period employers but 
charge them in inverse chronological order of employment . This method 
combines the theory of wage liability 'vith that of employer responsibility 
1. Ark., Colo., Ind., Iowa, Mich., Mo., Neb., Ohio, Ore., S.D., and Wise. 
I 
"Co!'QEarison of :State UneiJ!E;J-oyment C~~~~-~aws,Oct . 1948~oJ:lCi tp . 25 
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for unemployment; responsibility for the unemployment is assumed to lessen 
with time and the more remote the employment from the spell of unemployment, 
the less the probability of an employer being charged. A maximum is placed 
on the amount that may be charged any one employer ; when the limit is 
reached, the previous employer next in line is charged . The limit is 
usually fixed as a fraction of the wages paid by the employer or a specified 
amount in the base period or in a quart er, or a combination of the two. In 
Michigan and Wisconsin the amount of the charges against any one empl oyer 
is limited b ~.r the extent of the claimant's employment with the employer, 
i. e., the number of "credit weeks" he had earned with that employer. In 
Missouri an employer who employed a claimant less than three weeks is 
skipped in the charging. If a claimant's unemployment is short, or if the 
last employer in the base period employed him for a consiaerable part of the 
base period this method of charging gives the same practical results as 
charging the last employer in the base period. 
All the States which provide for charging in the inverse order 
of employment have by regulation determined the order of charging in case 
of simultaneous employment. 
3. Charges in Proportion to Base~period Wages 
On the theory that unemployment results from more general 
conditions of the labor market than from a given employer's separations, the 
largest number of States charge benefits against all base-period employers 
in proportion to the wages . earned by the · beneficiary with each employer. 
These States include 15 with reserve-ratio systems and 3 with benefit-ratio 
formulae and Texas with a benefit-wage system. Their charging methods 
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assume that liabilities for benefits inhere in wage payments. So also does 
the typical pattern of charging each base-period employer for total benefit 
wages up to the maximum amount specified; this method gives the same 
results as charging proportionately if no employer's wages exceed the 
maximum specified. However, any employer who paid more than the amounts 
specified is charged less than his proportion oft he total wages. 
In Maryland the principal employer in the base period gets the 
charge if he paid the claim ant 75% of hi s base-period wages;otherwise the 
charges are prorated proportionately among all base-period employers. In 
Florida an employer who paid a claimant less than $1).00 in the base period 
does not share in the charges. In West Virginia benefits paid for partial 
unemployment are charged to the last employer and in Minnesota and 
employer who employed a claimant part-time in the base period and continues 
to give him substantially equal part-time employment is not charged for 
benefits. 
Several States have special provision for indemnifying the em-
ployer to be charged in the case of benefits paid to seasonaL workers; in 
general, seasonal employers are charged only with benefits paid for unem-
ployment occllrring during the season, and non-seasonal employers, with 
benefits paid for unemployment at other times. 
Non-charging of Benefits1 
In many 'States there has been a. tenderJ,cy to recognize that the 
costs of benef its of certain types should not be charged to individual 
l. Gallagher, Rachel S., op. cit., p. 7 
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employers. ;rhis has resulted in "non-charging" provisions of various ty·pes 
in practically all ;state laws which base rates on benefits or benefit 
derivatives. In States with formulae which charge benefits, certain 
benefits are excluded from charging. A few States with benefi t-1' age ratio 
plcinS provide for exclusions from benefit wages, of benefits of ~nort dura-
t ion which are eliminated because the charges uder this system are wei ghted 
by potential rather than actual duration. 
The most comnon omission is very logical; if benefits are paid on 
the basis of an early determination in an appealed case and the determina-
tion is eventually reversed, no charge to the individual employer's 
account is made in many States. In some States charges are omitted for re-
imbursements in cases of benefits paid under a reciprocal arrangement 
authorizing the combination of the indiJ.vidual' s wage credits on two or more 
States, i. e ., in situations when the claimant would be ineligible in the 
State with the out-of-state wage credits. 
A newer type of omission of charges is for benefits paid following 
a period of disqualification for voluntary quitting, mis-conduct, or refusal 
of suitable work or for benefits paid following a disqualifying act for 
which no disqualification was imposed because the claimant had good 
personal cause · for leaving voluntarily. The intent i s to relieve the 
employer of charges for unemployment due to circumstances beyond his control 
by means ether than disqualification for the duration of the unemployment or 
the cancellation of wage credits from the employer left. The pr ovision s 
vary with variations in the employer to be charged and with the disqualifi-
cation provisions, particularly as regards the cancellation and reduction 
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of benefit r i ghts . 
co;JPAHISON OF RJSii G PLil.l'IJ:S 
The l ans f or rating e1nployers comist e ssent ially of tYvo parts . 
The first el ement i s an indicator of the employer's past exper ien ce. If 
sound social co st a ccounting or ey_uit y to empl oyers is t he prim--.. r y aim of 
the for:nul &. , benefits paid to f ormer -w orkers a r e the logical i ndicat o rs of 
each employer ' s ex1)erience. Existing reserve-ro.t io rati ng formulae all rest 
upon benefits charged . 
The terr.ts of the .State l aws <..~.re complicated, but the essemtial 
steps in measuremen t of the empl oyer 's experience a r e s impJJe • . Benefits 
charged against an employer are s ubtro.cted from hi s past contribut ion s in 
order to meas ur e the amount by which he more than covered , or fail ed to 
cover , the cost of benefits paid tovbrkers f o r -whose unemployment he is 
consi dered e sponsibl e . The resultant f igure is the employer ' s reserve 
bal ance . I o or de r t o reduce the experience of L-rge and s nall f _i_rm~ t o 
com.Jarabl e terms, each e ,nployer 1 s reserve balance is divided by his av- rage 
annual payroll. The quot ient is the enployer' s reserve ratio , which s erve s 
as an index of is empl oyment exper ience . Adopt ion of the r e serve-ratio 
measure i n pool ed fund l aw s i ndicat e s the tenacity of the underlying 
phi1osophy of the i rrl i vidua.l empl oyer r e serve plan . I n computing bo t h t he 
reserve balance and the r e serve ratio , i t is assumed tha t each empl oyer i n 
reali t yre tai n s a claim t o his contributions o.nd tho.t hi s -viorkers i n r eal.i ty 
___ I have a claim to every cent he has ;placed in the pool. 
,-
1 
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Formulae hased upon benefits charged are defi cient i n s everal 
I r e spect s . The impo s sibility of dloco.tin[; the responsi ility for u.ne mploy-
1 
ment t o specific employers , which i s the f undamental objection to all 
I exr;erience rating, make.s henefj.ts a poor !lleasure of experience. :!"or exampl e , 
j o cha rge benefits received by the enployees of an independent automobile-
.r:-1arts manufac t urer agai nst that, manufacturers c.1 ccount is a hie;hly o.rtif..i.cial 
1 procedure, since s easonal fluctuations i n this industry are the result of 
I 
I the annual slump in autombile produ.c t ion . The situation becomes even more 
I i nvolved if t be worker before he becu.me une1!1pl oyed h..:1d more than one empl oy-
er. In Stlch a case , to which employer sho u.ld the cost of co".l.Jens iltion be 
1 ehc:l.rged? No logical ans·wer exi sts be caD.se no .;eneralization a s to t~1e 
I 
responsibility of each past employer for the worker's spell of unerr.ploy:nent 
ca~ be val id in more than a few C.? "' "'~ . The haphazard nature of benefits 
charged as a measure of employe r s' res j,Jonsibili t y is further reveal ed by the 
' variable l engt h of the spells of compensated '.memployment . Is c..n employer 
' l ess responsible for une npl oyment if t he worke r hap1;e ns t o get a job after 
I 
! receivi n:-; one weekly benefit check? Has the employer caused more unemploy-
1 ment if the workers whom he lays off a re unfortunate enough to remain unem-
played and draw benefits for several weeks? These questions have .:.:. rouse ( 
su ch misgivings that some persons urged the o.doption of a rating f ormul a 
based t.:.pon the number of separated workers who receive benefits rather t' an 
upon the to tal amount of benefits received by separa ted workers. 1 
11. U. Soc. :Sec. Board--Bureau of Research md :Stat,istics, "Experience 
1 :ffating under State Jnetnplo ~)'ment Compensation Laws", Washi ngton, 
I ..ece11ber 8 -~--2}8,~=:"=-:...=l!~J_i=============================IJ======= 
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lf the 1Jrimi.iry f unction of experience rC~.ting is to be the attl:iin-
ment of employment stability rather than t.h e alloc ... tion of be:1efi t costs, a 
numl:Jer of invo l ved considerctt · ons govern the selection o ~ the E:x1::er .i.ence 
upon 1luch the r~LI·,es a r e to based . Emp"!-oyment stability ii:.self is a hydra-
headed concept . It may mean maintenance of the same volume of empl oymen t 
within a plant, and volume of emplo:yTnent, in turn , :nay be measured in terms 
of c .an,;es in the number empl oyed , in man hours of em1)1oyment or in total 
p~yrolls . On the other hand, emplo~nen t stability may mean retention of the 
same individuals in employment o·v·e r a given period. If maintenance 0 .1. the 
same individuals on che P~•yroll is a c ce1)ted ctS the sole criterion of em:::loy-
,nent st,.J.bil i t y , the other measures mentioned may f11~ctuate violentl y without 
lnfluenc:Lng an employer ' s record . Ra ting formulae bo..sed upon each of these 
criteria of s tability have been proposed . ·.ny one of them Viould serve to 
mec,sure orne sort of stability , bJ.t each would ignore benefit costs. S'-ich 
CQst s ma,,- s erve ~.s a basis for an equitable ra.t.Lng sy3tem, but they are an 
inade uate measure of empl o:y-ment stab.:..li.ty. 
"\fter the selection of the factor de signed t o indicc:tte e.i..ther the 
load pL "'ced U)on t,he fund by each empl oyer or his employment sto.bility, the 
.fint..cl ste9 in the r ating proce s 3--the .J.ssign:nent of ""ppropri~te contribJ.tion 
rate s--must be taken .1 For the purpose of r c:..ting employers c.:.ccording to the 
1. Rating plans disCLlssed i n this countrJ ,~enerally propose that each ind-
ividual employer ' s contribution rate be determined by his own experience 
It might be pos s i ble to tax all the firms in an indu.stry a t a uniform 
rate ba sed upon the gener al ri sk o.f unemplo;.rment existin6 in that indus-
trJ. This form of experience r o. tin?; was attempted in Gre at Britain . 
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burden t hey impose on the fund, several <:>.ltern .;.tive methods of determ :iming 
rates hav...: been dev l~:>e • Empl oyers m:...y be grouped into rat s classes '-ccord-
I. 
llng to a fixed , infl exibl e schedule or into as many classes as tl"te:m '"re rat.gs 
!The first principle has been u.dopted in ~;he present laws. Each employer's 
experi ence , a s revealed by the size of his reserve ra.tio , is com1:J<:..red with a 
stat~1tory scJ.:iedule, w_ icd indicates the co ntribution rate j)a;/able t o em-
pl oyer s vnth certain reserve ratios. Theoretically, the reserve r citios and 
lcorres)onding rate reductions are so a rranged that each employer will contri-
1 
I ibute roughly the amount of benefits that his former workers have withdrawn . 
Dissat i sfaction with t:--"' f'; ""'"::.:::1 , statutory schedul e has l e d the 
'Social Security Board to sugge st another pl an for assigning cont rihLltion 
I 1 1rates. Under this plan al. e'11ployers would be arranged on the basis of their I . 
lemplo;ywent records . If there He r e to be nine contribution ra:t es a.'ld the 
1total s tate payiull .for the prededins year· was $.900 ,000 , 000 ., the etilployers 
~ith the best records, representing t he first $:·100 ,000 , 000 . of payro l, would 
I ~e given the lowest r ._.. te. Any desired average percentaze of total payrolls 
_ · ght 1Je collected if t his scheme were appLied. 
method of rate ,:,dj ustment des~ened to maximize e'nplo7ers 11 stabili 
efforts must h:we a different basis f rom a pl an de signed to set up 
qui t able contrihu_tioE rates, which is the fundalnental pu.rpose of both the 
eserve-ratio schedllle and the arra,y pl ans . Employers whose worl~ is either 
U . .S . Social ~curity Board-- Bu.reatJ. of ResE:arch and Statisti c s, "~;c .peri-
en;; Rating under :State cJnemployment Compensation La·ws", Washington, 
Dece:nber 8, 1933, . 5lf. Th5 ~ "'""".'"l.S of assigning co _tribution rates has 
been .. adopted i n Utah. 
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ext remel y unstable or ext rer:1el - stM~)le sho 'l d be penal ized by high rates if 
avoidable unempl oj-men t occurs l n their establishments, and both kinds of 
empl oye::--·s shou G. to rew~.rde :J. i.f t 'h o•r .... t ccessfu.lly redL1ce unempl oymen t. The 
central pro l em of su ch a raLi.ng plan i s to separate fluct ,~ations in employ-
ment t hat are avoidable fro m those that a re inherent i n the business. The 
most plausible mean s of s eparo.tin:.:; avoidable from inherent unemployment is t 
rate all anpl oyers a ccording to their experience as compc.red wi th the ex-
per.lence of the i ndustry to VJ hich they belon g. 1 It is a ssumed tha t an 
employer has caused avo i dable unemployment if employment fluctu~tes more 
' wid el y in his plant t han i n the i ndus try as a i-'vhole . Con•.rersely, i f an 
employer' s experience is better than t ha t of his indust ry, it is assumed tha 
he has red·J.ced une1nployment by hi s own efforts. The virtue of industry 
r ating .Lsthu.t empl oyers with__xces::;ively Viide employment fl uctuations and 
t hose with very narrow f l uctuatwns can be given stl mJ.l a s to r eg ul a r_;_z e . 
I n s}li te of the desirabl e "" spe cts of indus tr::I rating , .r a tal l ogic 
and administrative objections have been ra~ sed against its adoption. It is 
em:pha~-1L,ed that th e c ::1uses of un<' .... -:'1 '"'~-.ent are almost as diverse within par-
ticular industry groups as vrl th in the e conomi c syatem as a whole and t hat 
t.he re is, accordin::;ly, no r eason to supJ?o se that an employer 1 s variation 
from an industry norm will reflect the volume of unemployme nt that he -has 
1. The principle ha s been made the basis of a carefully devised ~ting plan 
by Karl Pribram p.nd Philip Booth , described in their study for the ........,"'""' ....... "'i1 
Security Board , "Mer i t Rating and Unemployment Compensa t ion". It is 
also the principl e used for merit rati ng in -·Nor kmen 1 s Co.,lpensatlon. 
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either elimi nate d or caused. Moreover , it i s poi nted out that b oth foreign 
and dome stic experience indi cc.te the extreme d:;_ff i cu l t y of dev .ising an 
industrial classification suitdble for rati D~ purpose s. 
A rat i ng lan intended to maxi mize employers' efforts to stabil~ze 
would not r istribu t e the co st o f compensation a ccording t o the volume of 
benefits cha rgeable to an indlvidllal establishment. l~ bank that gave less 
stabl e empl oyment t han the banking industry as a "\'Vhole would pay a con tribu-
tion rate above the average, although the benefits paid to the bank ' s former 
empl oyee s might b e considerabl~r lass t han t he contriblltions paid by t h e bank . 
}_t t __ e s ame time , a n e::1pl oyer i n an unstabl e i ndustr. r might pcq a l ow contr::i,.. 
bu tion rate if his operation s we :":"" '!"~'l.n,tively stable, despite t he payment of 
a l arge volume of benefits t o hi s former workers. 1 
I t would Cl}lpear fro m this bri ef review of ratin E::; pl ans t hat the 
dual a i ms of experience ra. ting make impossible th e sel ection · of a measure of 
employers ' experience as well as the formulat ion of a methJd of a s s igning 
r ates t hat 1J'ro uld <1 t the s s.me time distribu t e the cost of benefits and stimu-
l a t e empl oyers' efforts to stabilize. Discussion of experi ence rating as a 
device f o r _ ttaj.ning bo t h an equitable r <-tte structure ..;.nd mo.ximum stabiliza-
tion e fforts i s academic, becau se any f ormul c. will promo t e one ob j ec tive at 
the expense of the other . But de spit e the criticisms t hat c an be made of 
any rating scheme, it is possible th<.L t a f airly r easonable and satisfact or y 
1. Richard .A . Lester and Charles V. Kidd, The Ca se Against Experience Rat-
ing i n Unemployment Compensation , I ndustrial Rel a tion s Counselors, I nc ., 
N. Y:: 1939 , Pp 33-3 . 
formul a can be "~Nor ked out. The .;.Jrim::. r y obj ect i on s to experience rating, 
theref ore , rest not only upo 1 the shortcomi n _;s of t he r at· ng 1: roce ss but 
also upon the uneconomic and 3) ciall y unde s irable effects that wil l fol low 
the c..dop tion of any r~ tinz pl an1 
THE HASS ACHUSE'Yf 'S EEHEF IT --Wi~GE RATIO PL1~N 
The benefit-wage r . .1.tio system, the plan noiN used in Hassachuse tts, 
is a modification of the 11 Texas plan 11 or the "Cliff e pl &n" of ex1)erience 
rating ( nu.med a fter the aut hor of this method). 
Section 14 of t he Mass achuse tts Employment Sec,lrity Law p rovide s 
t _at empl oye rs v.ith a f avorable benefit and contrihution e. _perience over a 
sufficient _period of years may be en t itled to reduced contribution rate s. 
Generally , an employe r must be continuousl y subject to the Employment Secur -
i t y Law for 5 years e f ore he can be en titled to the experience r ating pr o -
I vi sions of the law. When enplo,;-ers become eL igibl e for conside r ation for 
ex;;erien ce r a t i ng they are aut o%"'tically no tif led by t he Division of E:npl oy-
rnen t 'Security of their rate s whether t hey be 2. 7% or lower. 
The empl oyer ·w ho is subj ect t o the Federal Un employment .2xcise Tax 
I (an em:;:;lo;yer oi 8 or more) and who obtai.ns a l ower contribu t ion rate may ded 
I uc t the full 8ffiount of the normal 2. 7% 'State contr i bu tion against such Feder 
al tax up t o 90% of that tax, provide d such contributi.ons are paid on t ime . 
I bid , Pp 35-37. 
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The contribution rate s under experience rating are : . 5%; 1%; 
1.5%; 2. 0%; 2. 5% ; 2.7% . 
The reduced r ate is based on employer ' s ex1)eri ence . An employer 
may be subj ect to the l aw f or the req 1~ired period of t i me , but, because of 
hi s emplo;y'1flent experience may not be en titled to receive a red uced contribu-
tion rate. 
Two fact ors <till determine whether or not the i ndividual employe :::· i 
e,_t itled to aredllced ro.te when eligible. These are the individual "employ-
er's benefit vvage r atio tt, ·which is bas ed on his b enefit and contributions 
ex;Jerience , and the "sto.te experience factor " , ·which is based on s tatewide 
benefit co sts.l 
Determin · tion of employer 's benefit v~rage rat io .--'Nhenever a worker 
fi l e s 2. valid cl aim an.d i s paid "i:"'",..,,+'~ ... ,s, regardl e ss of the amoun t paid , the 
base period wage s2 paid t o the-vorker are charged against each of his base 
period employers as 11benef.Lt wage s". I n charging such tt ba se period wages " t 
an employer's account as ''benefit wagestt they are cha r ged during the cal en-
dar year in whi ch t he first pa.yment of benef its is made . The emplo~Te r re-
sponsi "'Jl e for · the layoff or discharge of th e worker may not necess2.rily be 
the one a6ai nst whom the charge is made becaase of the fact that charge s 
apply only to the emplo~rer or emplo;re rs who paid wages in the b ase peri od . 
1. "-ii;Tn.pl oymen t 'Security Program in Mas sachusetts", Di v i sion of E1npl oyment 
Security , Boston , Massachusetts, 1949 , Pp 2-J . 
I 2. For cl aims arising in the "benefit year" Aprll 1 , 1949, through March 31 
1 19)0, "base per i od wages" are those paid in the calendar year 1 948 . 
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an amou..11 t. equal to one and one-half times the anount of the highest amount 
of benefits paid, the redl.lced rates under the experience rating provisions 
of the l aw will beco me effective. 
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To determine the aontribution rate of employer A under the 
experience rating provisions of the law, assume the following experience 
records1 for the years 1, 2, and 3: 
Benefit Payment from 
Fund 
Aggregate Benefi t 
Wages for Entire 
Year l 
$17,000,000 
Year 2 Year 3 Totals 
$18 , ooo,ooo $17,000,000 $52,000,000 
state 12o ,ooo,ooo l45 ,ooo,ooo l35,ooo,ooo 4oo,ooo ,ooo 
11Benefi t Wage s" of 
Employer A's Former 
Employees 900 1,100 1,000 3,000 
Employer A's Taxable 
Payroll with Respect 
to which Contribu-
tions were Paid on 'i'ime 10 ,000 10,000 10,000 30,000 
.Determination bf "State Experience Factor" 
Total Benefit Payments 
from Fund 
$52,000,000 Divided by 
Aggregate Benefit Wages 
for State 
$400,000,000 Equals 13% 
From the above calculation it will be seen that the "~tate 
,s 
Experience Factor", which is the ratio of payments from the Unemplo;yment 
Compensation Fund to aggregate benefit wages for the entire State, would 
be 13%. 
Determination of Employer A's "Benefit Wage Ratio" 
Wages of A 1 s Employees 
Against which Compens-
able Claims Have Been 
Filed (Benefit Vvage s) 
$3 ,000 Divided by 
Employer A' s Taxable Pay-
roll with Respect to which 
Contributions have been 
Paid on Time 
$30,000 Equals 10% 
The above calculation 'indicates that Employer :A's "Benefit Wage 
Ration, which is the percentage obtained by dividing the. benefit wages paid 
----~=-=-====~~Tb~~ek4f~o~]d]~o~w~i~nlli~m~o~d~e~L~s~ar~e~s~~~- ~L~a~r~t~o~r~e~a~J~i~t~Y-~=============================9F========== 
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to his employees who filed compensable claims by his taxable payroll subject 
to contributions would be 10% . 
In determining an employer's benefit wage ratio, only that part of 
his payroll with respect to which contributions were actually paid on or be-
fore the due date is considered. Failure by an employer to pay contributions 
on any part of his taxable payroll on or before the due date will mean that 
the employer rna~ not obtain the lowest contributionrate to which he might 
otherwise have been entitled. 
Determina tion of Employer A's reduced contribution rate--having 
calculated the 11State Experience Factor" aTJ.d flmployer A 1 s 11 Benefi t Wi:l.ge 
Ratio" it now becrJme s pillssible to determine Employer A's reduced contribution 
rate by use of the following table: 
DETEm.~ 1NAT ION OF RATES m MASSACHUSETTS 
:State 
Experience Employers Benefit Wage Ratio 
----------------------------------·---------------------------Factor .5% 
Con, Rate 
ld//0~ So% 
2 I 25 
3 I 17 
4 I 13 
5 I 10 
6 1 8 
7 1 7 
s
1 
6 
9 I 6 
.1.0 s 
... 1 I 5 
2 I 4 
.L3 'V~-- -- -4- --
.._ )~ 4 
15 3 
16 3 
17 3 
1.8 3 
19 3 
20 3 
1% ,~.5% . 
Con. Rate ( .. :m . Bate 
I 100% ' 150% so . 75 
33 1 5o 
25 38 
20 30 
17 25 
14 { 21 
13 1 19 
11 16 
10 1 15 
9 ll4 
8 'I' 13 
--8- - """'=>12 
7 ll 
7 10 
6 9 
6 9 
6 8 
s 8 
5 8 
2.0% 
Cop Bat e 
200/b 
100 
66 
So 
4o 
34 
29 
25 
22 
20 
18 
17 
lS 
14 
13 
12 
12 
11 
11 
10 
2.5% 2. 7% 
eon R~t~ Con ~~t& 
250% 
12S 
83 
63 
so 
42 
36 
31 
28 
25 
23 
21 
19 
18 
17 
16 
lS 
14 
13 
13 
Benefit 
Wage 
Ratio 
In 
Excess 
Of 
2.5% 
Column 
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Method--Go down the l eft-hand column l abeled ":State Experience 
Factor" until number 13 is reached , which is the "State Experience Factor" 
in the illustra~ed case . Then go across horlzontal ly, on the same l ine on 
which number 13 a~pears, into the "Employer ' s Benefit ·vage Ratio " column 
unt il a pe rcentas e which is equal to or next higher than employer A 1 s benefit 
wage rcLtio of 10 is reached . In thi s case, it is necessary- to 0 0 d. cross the 
t able to column 3 whe re a percentac;e of 12 i s r eached . 'I'he contribution r ate 
of 1.5% which appears at the head of col umn 3 vnll be employerA ' s reduced con 
tribution rate f or the cal endar year 1 ~49 . The dotted l ine indicates the 
manner in wh i ch the contribution rate is determined . 
If in this case, empl oyer A' s benefit wage ratio was in excess of 
the be c1efit wage ratio appearing in column 5 on the same 1 ine as number 13 in 
the "State 3xperience Factor" , employer A's contribution rate would b e 2. 7% ; 
in other words , there would be no reduction in his contr-ibut ion rate . 
CHAPTER I V 
CRI:SIS I N Tl-IE HA.'SSACHUSETT:S 
UNTh~PLOTiffiNT COMPENSATI ON FtmD 
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.As of December 19, 1949: a t tention was drawn to the f o...ct t at the 
Unemployment Compensation Fund availa bl e f or benef it s had become l e s s than 
the amount of benefit expen s e of the year 1949 to that date. 
In keeping with the mandate appecirin& in section 14 ( d ) of the 
I ~~assachusetts E.mployment Secur-l ty Law a fo r mal decl a r ation was made t the 
I effect that the line.nployment Compensation Fo.nd av s.ilu.ble fo r benefits had 
I 
\ become less t.ha11 t he amount of benefit expense i n that year of the most 
recent calendar years not exceedi n,::; ten in which the highest enefit expense 
lwas paid • . ;:;;f .fecti ve the first .:J_ uarter of 1950 , the l owest four r a tes of 
emplo] ers 1 contributions were advanced one half of one per cent and the 2. 5 
per cent rat e WdS advanced to 2. 7 per cent. 
n Decembe r 27 , 1950 , again i n keeping with t he above mandate , the 
cono.i.t ion of the Unempl oyment Compensat ion Fund was once agai n scrutiniz ed. 
I t vms found thai:, two or more calenda r quu.rter s had el apsed s.ince the ori-
gi nal declc .... rc;.tlon , and that t he f und c:ontinued l~o be lower than t e afore-
mention·~:d benefit ex!Jense of t he year 1949. Another announcement of t he 
condition of the fund was m"'"de , c.nd effective the first quarter of 1951, all 
empl oyer contrlbut i on r c..tes are r o.ised to 2 . 7 per cent of such pay roll a s 
\i s subject to this chapter of the Law. 
I n keepin~ with the provis ion s of section 14 (d) the aforementioned 
unifo r m 2. 7 per cent contribution rate 1rvill r emain i n e ffect until the 
Unempl:)yment Compensation I"und bec·:>mes mo re than an amount equal t o one and 
one half times the ar.1ount of suer hi ~J.- ; st benefit expense f or s uch ca lender 
year . As of the day of t hi s report the benefit expense for the year 1949 
still r emains the highest because t he benefit expenses during t he year 1950 
were les s than l ()49 . 
The peopl e of VIassachuset t s are very much disturbed by the dwind-
lin]; size of the une:~lployment insurc..nce fun d 0-nd are greatly inter ested in 
l earnin~ the cause of this dilemna , which very possibl y coul d cut them off 
vvi t hout any unemployment insurdnce in t he event of a prol onged recession 
simila.r to thJ. t of 1949 . Many rea sons hcwe been su,:;gested a nd many solution <> 
propose d b;:r the nev1spaper s and other busi ness i nterests, all of which, i n my 
opinion , are masterful a t tempts to divert attention from t he major cau se of 
the current f und cris i s. The r efore, it will be the aim of this chaFter to 
shaY{ -c,hc1t merit rat ing , t he struct ure of inclus try, and ind,~ strial practice s, 
more so than any other f~ctors have deprived the f und of the necessary money 
to s ee !Jassachuset.ts throu;;h any !'~"HJI"!~'Jl e crisis and that a re turn to merit 
rati:1s; a s we know it in Massachusetts, is al mo st an impossibil i ty . 
Liberc•liza t ion of Massachusett s Lavis Since 1935 
----- -- -
Since t\ e origi n.=.:.l enactment of the R'Tiployment Secur lty Law , many 
changes have been made . I t would be well now to look o.t a f ew of t hese 
change s, some of which are self-expl anatory and others which will be ex-
plained in detail . 
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As to employers : 
(a) During a ~eriod from January 1, 1936 to December 31, 1939 
Jlassachusetts employers were subject to contributions based upon total wages. 
~ffectivd Janu~ry 1, 1940 Wdges in excess of ~3,000. to an individual in a 
claendar year were not, taxable . This wq.s consistent with the amendment to thE 
Federal Unemployrnent rax Act in 1939 . :See table below for estimated sav ings 
11..0 emplo :{ers. 
(b) A major fact ·)r which meant considerable savings for 
~mployers was experience rating or merit rctting as it was originally labelled . 
i.educed rates of employers 1 contributions became actually operative in prac-
(Lice on Jama ry 1, 1942. 
TABLE A 
'Savings due to (1) ~1>3,000. limit, and (2) experience rating l 
Savings Due t o Savings Due to 
Year Total Savings ~$3000 . Limit on Wages Experience Ru.ting 
1 ~f~9~4~2--~$~'~2~8~,4ff~7 $ ~803,129 ~------~~~ 2~1~,'6~0~8',?5~5~8~~-----------~ 
~943 43,998,605 
~94h 50 , 3)2 ,h65 
~945 54 ,396,797 
~946 64,855,197 
~947 65,805,185 
~948 63 , 909,556 
~949 
Tot al 
I 
59,542,732 
,431' 272 ' 224 
9, 0h5,910 34,952,695 
9,869,095 4o,483,370 
9,864,436 44,532,361 
11,735,350 53 ,119 , 847 
17,565 ,595 48 , 239 ,590 
18,.339,653 45,569,903 
17,642,732 41' 9!)0 ' 000 
f?lOO, 865 ~900 $3)0 ,406, 324 
~ · Bo use No. 2175, "Sup)l ementary Re 1Jort of the Special Comnission Relativ e to the Employment Security Law" April , 1~48, P. 53 
TABLE B 
---
Contributions ·Go UnemploJ~ent Compensation Fund2 
Cal. Tax. i··rage s Contribution 
Year Total Waff.eS Tot, Wage s Taxable Wages Hate Contributions 
1942 2, 413,913 ,104 90% 2,179 , 945,402 1.52 33,228,173 
1943 2, 85? ,607, 800 88 2,)22 , )73,600 1.28 32 , 327 , 5oo 
194L~ 2, 902,065 ,900 87 2,536,543 , 900 l.Ol) 25' 740,910 
1945 2, 878 , 820,500 87 2, 513 ,471,000 . 88 22,091 ,151 
1946 3,253,410,700 87 2,818, 768,100 . 88 24,863,940 
l 9L~7 3,646,698 ,900 8) 3,098 ,747, 300 1.13 34,972,604 
1948 3,949,785 ,000 83 3,270 ,538,60o 1.31 42,990 , 475 
1949 3, 792 ,9J_CJ_ , 825 _83_ ____ 3_,139 ,496, 290 1.42 44 ,421 ~ 317 
Total Contributions 260,636,070 
2. Table B has b een compiled from stat i stical data obtained from t he Research and Statist i cs 
Department of the Division of E:nployment 'Security. 
-..J 
1-' 
I 
e e I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
TABLE C 
UNEi'tPLOYMb'NT COMPLN'SATION FUNDl 
1942-1949 
Collections · I 
Inter .& I Income Total Net 
J.benal- I Credited Collectiom Benefit Addition Balance jYear Contributions ties Total by u:s. and Payments to in 
1
Dec . 31 Employer 1Emp 1 ee2 ( Net) Collections Treasury Income (Net) Fund Fund 
I T942 37,249,966 4,621 41j , 35t) 37,302, 946 2,t30l, 073 40,104 , 020 ll,5t31,102 2u,522 , 9lt) 36,tiOo,376 
11943 33;156,804 2, 3 72 57, 022 33 '216 ,199 3,100 ,146 36,316 ,345 2,370,196 33 , 946 ,149 70' 754,525 
1944 28 , 003,314 3,226. 36,181 28 ,042,722 3,367 ,2'71 31,409, 993 2,770 ,135 28 ,639 , 858 Cl- 99 , 394 ,3 84 
1945 23,331 ,355 1,924 24,658 23 ,357,938 3,93 2,378 27 , 290 , 316 14,433, 885 12, 856,431 212,250 ,815 
1946 22,986 , 892 1,194 22,517 23,010 , 6o5 3,974,689 26, 985,294 42,801,876 ·:'r15' 816,5 81 96,434 , 234 
1947 33,013,709 765 27,275 33,041,750 3, 718,186 36,759 ,937 53,4 71 , 309 '~6, 711,372 ;.79 ' 722,862 I I 
1?48 41,660 ,491 657 33 ,46o 41,694,610 3,667,010 45,361,620 50,053,266 -:}4,691 ' 646 1 75,031 '215 
1949 44,130 ,170 1 2 39 ,44Lf 44 ,172,626 3,388 ,012 47 , 56o,6J9 115, 249 ,142 -:<67 ,688,503 107,342,712 
Totals 263,532,706 14,774 ~ 88,919 63,839,399 D7,948,768 291,788,167 292,730,912 
I Bal ance Dec.3l,l949 107 , 342,712 107 , 342,712 .. _, , 
I l. Research and Statist ics Department, Massachusetts Division of Employment 'Sec'lrit y 
2. Employee contribut i on3 began Jan . l , 1937. They were eLiminated from the l aw as of Jul y 1, 1938. 
Amounts collected sunce then represent contributions with r e::>pe ct to wages earned prior to July 1, 1938 
~} Decrease 
I 
I 
·..J I 
I I'J 
I 
-
--
I 
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A look at Tables A. and B presents a very interestinc; pictur e . The 
total savings to empl oye rs due to experience r o.ting from l942-19L~9 were 
~li330 ,406,324. This figure i s 127% or l. 27 ti..mes greater than t.he 
!w260 ,636 , 070 -,vhich were act"ctally contributed to the fund during the same 
period of time. Had experience r ating not been in effect, total contribu-
tions at the end of 1 949 would have been ~~591, 042,394 , and instead of a fund 
bc.lance of $1 07 , 342,712 there would have been a balance of $437 , 749,036 1 
and thus it can be s een that instead of the balance in the f und being approx-
imately ~t8 million less than the total benefits paid out in 1949 , it would 
have been $320 million greater. Instead of a threat of insolv ency the fund 
would be fi nancially secure and able to meet any impending crisis. 
Another look at Tables A cmd B will al so show that empl oyers saved 
$1 00 , 865,900 due to the :~3 , 000 limit on wage s . Thi s figure is equal to 38% 
of t otal contributions. Had there not bee n a ~pJ ,000 l imit from 1 942-1 949 
total contributions would have been :$J61 , 50l ,970 . The balance i n the fund 
woul d have been $208,985 , 444 o r twice the amount. that wa s actu.ally there in 
1949. 
If we tal<.:e the savin2s due to experience r ating and the savings due 
to t.he :~ 3 , 000 limit and add them together , the figure i s $431,¢72 , 221-l. which i l 
166% or 1.66 times greater than .::.ctual total contributions . If we a dd t he I 
total saving s to the b<.1l ance i n the fund at the end of 1 949, we a r r i ve at a 
figure on;· 538 ,614, 9361which i s appr oximatel y 402% or 4 times grea ter tha n the 
actual f und balance. This potential figure , even the great.est skeptic would 
agree, could adequately take care of any fore seeable crisis. 
1. Pl u s the interest that would have been earned on the addit ional i ncor:J.e . 
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A rather important fact to remembe r is that the years 1942-1949 
were years of pro sperity when em~loye rs could easily have a fforded to pay t he 
full 2. 7% witho-J.t injuring or impd.iring their ability to do business. It 
should be remembered that unemployment insuro.nce , as originally concei ved , 
!Was supposed to be an automatic stabilizer for the economy. However, gr<ifted 
onto the process is a destabilizer-- merit rating . Under this system i n crease< 
unemployment leads to higher contribution rates. rhe higher contribution 
rate dJ.ring bad times puts an extra burden on industry when it can least bear 
it . rhus employers lo ok around for met hods of cut t.ing costs and l ay off some 
of their workers which !Tlakes matters worse. During prosperity , when employer-
could easily absorb hi gher contribution r ates so as to build up reserve s for 
l ean years, the contribution rates a r e decreased under the merit r ati ng 
sy stem whi ch leads to the uneconomic after-effects during depression. 
Al though it is true that this destabilizing arrangement, which meets none of 
t he t ests of an automat ic stabilizer, is not enough to cancel the stabilizing 
effect of t he unemplo;lilent insurance s ;rstem, nevertheless, it does weaken it. 
The following are liberalizations in the unemployment insurance 
l aw that, directly a f fecte d employees. 
Benefits: 
Waiting Period : 
1935-----------------4 weeks consE!cutively 
1937-----------------3 II II 
July 1, 1938---------2 " II 
Aug. 12, 1939--------2 11 11 
2 weeks partial equal to 
~~k-~-~J ~o~/1~2~-=-~l=="====~~==o=n=e~w~e=e~k~t~o~t~a~l ~.~)================~========== 
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WEEKLY BENEFIT RATE. 
Minimum Maximum 
Prior to 1939 $5 .oo $1).00 
April 1, 1940 6.00 15 . 00 
April l, 1943 6 . 00 1 8. 00 
April 1, 1945 6.00 21 . 00 
April l , 1946 6.00 2).00 
As of October 1 , 1940 , partial benefits were paid . 
Maximum Amount of Benefits : 
Since April l, 1940, 30% of base period, or 20 time s the 
benefit rate, Y'ihichever is t he l esser. 
Since April 1, 1945 , 30% , or 23 times the weekly benefit rate, 
whichever i s the lesser . 
Wage '~uo.lifications: 
Prior to April 1, 1940, e arnings of $1 60 in 2 of 4, or $240 in 
4 of 8 , quarters. 
April 1, 1940, to October 28, 1941, 25 times the benefit rate. 
Since October 28 , 1941, flat amount of ~n5o in base period 
(calendar year preceding benefit year) required to qual ify for 
benefits. 
I n c.ddil:.ion to the l iberalizat ion in the weekl y benefit amount , the 
l egisl ature in 1 946 added a $2 .00 payment for each dependent child under 1 8 
e yea rs of age to claimants over and above their weekly benef it r ates. The 
total weekly benefit that a claimant. may receive is limited by the provi sion 
that it shall not exceed his weekl y wage. The effect of dependents' 
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allowances is to increase the average benef l t check and reduce the maximum I 
number of weeks for which benef _i_ts a re payable, since the maximum potential 
benefit credit is computed without reference to su.ch allowa.nces. The over-
all effect of the provision for the pa;rment of dependents' allowances ha s 
l been comparatlvel.r small--amounting to $2,210,451, or 2.8~6 of total benefit 
payments during the period from April, 1947, through September, 1948. 
As the following table 3hows , there hclS been some reduction in the 
!duration of benefits. 
Average Duration of Benefits 
Benefit Year Potential Actual 
1945-46 19 . 4 s.s 
1946-47 18. 2 8.2 
1947-48 17.4 7.8 
The reduction in pot.:.mtial duration in the benefit year 1946-47 is 
attributed primarily to the increase in the maximum benefit rate to $25, whic 
cut down potential duration for some clai mant s in the ~~22-25 bracket. The 
decreases in average po".:.ential and ave rage <~ctual durai:,ion in 1947-48 are 
partly att-ributed t '.) the hi!:£her ave r age weekly benefits payabl e in that year 
as a result of the initiation of dependents' all owances. 
Contributions: 
Estimated savings to employees contJributions that would have been 
collected through 1947 if provision t herefor had not been 
repealed : 
e 
7'7 
Year Estimated Additional 
Amount that would have 
been collected 
1938 t!· •W 6,ooo,ooo * 
1 939 11,223,489 
1940 12,241,013 
1 941 1) , 615 , 350 
1 942 19 , 070 , 688 
1943 22,068 , 529 
1944 22,193,166 
1945 21,990 '760 
1946 24 , 649 , 142 
1947 26 2332~41+6 
Total ©1 81 ,384 ,~83 
-:~For t he 1 ast 6 mo nt hs of the year . 
The ;above tabl e i ndic;::.tes that in ccddi tion to l ibe r al ization in the 
benefit fo rmul a , the em 1)l oyees saved ~n81 , 3 84 , .58 J with the elimination of 
e:11 ' loyee cont ributions which were in t he l aw when origi nally enb.cted . The 
or i~inal l aw pr ov ided f or a 1% contribution ·which wc.. s l ev led aga i nst t,he 
empl oyee . This pr ovision was suspended on Ju.ly 1, 1938 , and reiJeal ed by t he 
l egislature a S of January l, 1 939. l 
The above to.bl e s show t hat empl oyees as ·well as employers have 
benefited from l i be:calization in the l aws. HoYvever , <.... comp"'rison will show 
1. Hou s e No . 22.50--Bienni al Re·oort of the :st a te Adviso r y Co·J.ncil , Divis ion I 
of 2mpl oyment Securi t y , Jani.lary , 1 949 , P . 9 ,10. 
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that employers have benefited much more. From 1938-1947 employees saved 
·'I· s s· cs 6 · #l 1, 3 4,:J 3., a figure equal t o 9~b of total contribut.L.on by employers . If 
' this fi::;ure is added on to ~he- tota.l contributions, the neY: fund bal.::ince 
would be :::·h42, 020,6)J., 1.7 ti ·L:... the <-. ctual contribution s. This is a fairly 
sizable sum. However , if v~e comp<.:. re it with the amount the ewployers saved , 
it loses its magnitude . 1 /l.nother thin..:· which sould be remembered is that 
the purpose of the unemployment insurctnce l c;,.w is to com.l:-'ensate the worker fo 
unempl o:.rm:3nt over w:t1ich he has no control. If the worke r has no control ove 
the u:J.em ~lo2'11lent, then the l esisl ature was justified in abolishi:J.,=- employee 
contributions to the fund. The only jJ.stification adv-"nced for reduction in 
empl oyers• contributions via experience rating is t 1e stabilization of em-
pl oytTJ.ent idea. If th<.:. t is the case , ·what wa s the reasoning behind experienc1• 
ratin3: during Wo rld vv-a.r II when the employer did not b~y- his o>"m e fforts 
stabilize empl?;y!Tlent? In many o the r states experience rating was abol.i..shed 
durin:; the war years for the very· reason th.:1.t employment had become :::ta-
bil.i..zed dJ.e to the shortage of labor supply and increased gov8rn,nent s 1Jend-
ing on r1a terials and equipm .. m::. necessary for the war. 
Condition of t he Unemplo;yment C__,~.::::eTJse.t .... on F·und · 
The l evel of funds available for benefits in Massachusetts reached 
an all time lovr in 1949, vvhen the percentage of f unds available to taxable 
1 wa~e s was only J. 4% . This rate vra s low·er than that o.f any other state in th: 
United StCt.tes (see table D). This f i gllre of 3.4;.6 is roughly 65~~ l ess than 
that for the United 'St~Ltes as a whole. I t is 30;'b l ess t han the 4. 9% for 
Rhode Island which is t 1e next l owest to Hassachusetts and 76% l ower than 
- -
' 
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I TABL E D 
----
I 
I 
Fund s Available for Benefits 
by State (Dec. 31,1949) 
I 
I E'unds Available 
I to Taxable Wage s Fund Bal &'1 c· e s Taxabl e ~Nage s 
% 
u. :c-..:;.. 9. 2 $?, 009 , 586 ,000 $76 , 258 , 730 , 000 
-
.Habama 6. 8 56, 415 , 000 824, 870 , 000 
Airzona 11.3 28 , 377, 000 250 , 600 ,000 
!Arkan sas 9. 6 37 , 951 , 000 395 ' 221 , 000 
I calif 9 • .3 591,309 ,000 6, 353 ,675, 000 
.Cor orado 11. 9 54,729 ,ooo 459 , 521,000 
I 
I 
IConn3ctic2t 10 . 9 157,541,000 1 , 446 , 507 , 000 
I 6.7 14, 546,000 216,554 ,000 ·Delaware 
I 
I 
:Florida 8. 8 71 , 821 ,000 816, 491 , 000 
i 
I ~. 
, _reo g i a 10.3 102,728,000 993 ,156,000 
I 
ITdab 12.3 26,187,000 212, 205 , ooo .L _o 
I 
;Illinois 8.3 
I 
484 , OJ.l ' 000 5, 802 , 689 , 000 
!Indiana 8.7 187, 7 1, 00 2,168 , 656, 000 
I 
· I ovl a. 11. 8 92 ,736,000 787 ,068 , 000 
Kansas 11.1 64,350 ,000 579 , 200 , 000 
Kentucky lh. 4 117 , 874, 000 818 , 526 ,000 
Louisiana 10. 5 99 , 717,000 9 53 ' 18 2' 000 
Mai ne 10 . 6 38,b58,ooo 36h, 95h, ooo 
I 
j_A;:.ryland 9. 7 l16,3L.4,ooo 1, 204, 697 , ooo 
' i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
TABLE Q ( cont.) 
Funds Avail~":l e for 3enefi ts 
by State (Dec:-31, 1949 ) 
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'~-______,.,~~::-------------ll I Funds }.vailable 
to 
Massachusetts 
'l!li chigan 
Minnessota 
I Iflissi ssip)i 
I 
1f ' I .. lSSO ri 
Hontana 
Nebras: a 
Nevada 
t ew Jampshire 
I Nevr .Jersey 
I I New ne--ico 
New -:::or 
~{orth Carolina 
i 
I JJorth Da.ko t a 
I Ohio 
j Oklahoma 
10regon 
I Fenns~fl vania 
! 
! HJ ode Island 
I 
Taxabl e IV a(:"e s b 
c f 
/0 
3. 4 
7.2 
10 . 0 
13 . 9 
10.6 
13.4 
9. 6 
14.3 
8.3 
13 . 6 
10.2 
8. 3 
12. 6 
9.1 
10 . 2 
7. 4. 
10 .3 
8.3 
4. 9 
Fund Balances 
$107,343 , 000 
297,095 , 000 
122, 946 ,000 
43,052, 000 
187,516, 000 
31 , 257,000 
34_,854,000 
13,190,000 
22 , 069 , 000 
427 , eo6 , ooo 
21 , 45c,ooo 
887 , 033 , 000 
154, 107,000 
9,637,000 
47 ,963 , 000 
81 ,379, 000 
574, 070 , 000 
24 , 983 , 000 
Taxable -w·ages 
$3 ' 139 ' 1..~98 , ooo 
4,145' 603 , ooo 
1 , 228,693 , 000 
310 , 482, 000 
1 , 762,109,000 
234, 099 , ooo 
364, 063 , 000 
92 , 471 , 000 
266, ooo , ooo 
3, 152,196, 000 
210 , 299 , 000 
10 , 637,654, 000 
1 , 224, 060 , 000 
106,143, 000 
5,188 ,019 , 000 
646, 816 ,000 
790 ,305 ,000 
6, 881 , 114, 000 
505 ; 358, 000 
uth Carolina 
South Dakota 
·.Cennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
W ashine;ton 
We st Virginia 
Wisconsin 
1 Wyoming 
TABLE Q (cont.) 
Funds Available for Benefits 
by 'State (Dec. JI, 1949) 
Funds Avallable 
t o Taxable Wa.e;es Fund alances 
C'! ;o 
8.3 '" So ,on ;ooo <;p 
8.4 9,823,000 
9. 8 96,874, 000 
8.2 21? ,oh6,ooo 
11.3 / 2,400 ,000 
11.4 14,880 ,000 
7.7 79,776,000 
11.5 150 '768,000 
9.5 6, 733 ,000 
12. 4 216,648,000 
9.5 12, 884, 000 
7 8c 
Taxable :;ra;:;es 
( . 
~~ 600,141, 000 
11.7 , 631,000 
984,7 2),000 
2,685,6oo,ooo 
287,570 ,0 0 
130 '4 7 2' 000 
1,035, 8) , 000 
1,305,416,000 
917' 765 , ooo 
1, 741,290 , 000 
13.5, 87 ,ooo 
Source ~ Handbook of Jnemplo:y1nent Insurance, Fin;n cial Date. 1938-1949) 
Department of Labor, Bureau of i:mpl oyment Security, 
Vashington , D. C., December, 1949. 
I 
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I 
the 14.4% of f unds available to t axabl e vr<.t 6 e s for Kent·J.cky whlch is the 
hi :;hest in the country. 
A ma j or cause of this low l evel of funds u.vc..ilable for benef i ts 
was, first, that ~.~assachusetts had no war r i sk contribution . Several states 
· (see table E) made t his a llowance and now he:.ve a percentage of f unds av~il-
abl e to t.:J.xable v;a::.;es that ~i.s a good deal h.~gher than that for Massachusetts. 
Secondl y , c rnt. r ibution rate s i n Md.ssachusetts have not been. flexible enough 
to C)pe with chanse s in em}l o;ymant. In 194.2 and 1943 the contribution rat e 
i n Massachusetts was l o'NGr than t hat for all t he other states exce;Jting t wo . 
(see table E) . In 1 944 and 1945 the lassachusetts rc...te wa s lower t han all 
others exce1Jt ing jus t om~. However, Zrom 1 945 ( t he end of World War II) on , 
each year , more and mo re staGes have l ower r a t e s t han Ma ssachusetts and have 
no crisis in t heir Unemployment Co~:J.pensation Funds. The follo·wing is an 
expl anat i on of w~w this set of circumstance s exists. n ,_,_ring the war years 
of l942-19h5 emplo;yrnent i n manufacturing i ndu strie s in Massachusetts was 
high and une:Pploy~nent in t he st~ ... e r as r el u.t i vely low. Hov:-ever , with the 
end of Worl d ·v{ar II manufacturing industrie s in Massachusetts suffered a 
c.reat deal of unemployrnent, mo re so than the country as a whole and this 
) l aced a great strain on the fund . The average contribution rate i n Mass-
achusett s unde r the experience r ating plan be came higher, but the co 1di ti on 
of the Fund contin..1ed to get ·wors e . The reason for this is that the struc-
t L<re of experience r ati.nc; in Mussachus etts per mitt ed rates to drop too far 
during prosperous years and didn 1 t all ow fo r rates to go up fast enough and 
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Tl~BLE E 
1942 1943 1 944 _1945_ 1946 1947 1948 1949 
..., 2. 19 2. 091 1. 921 1.?11 l Ll+l l. 24 u. ..:!> , 1. 43 1.3 
Ala1: ama 1. 59 1.42 
l 
1 .311 
-991 .so1 . 95 1.01 1 . 1 
.:..rizona 2. 51 2.33 2 ... 12 1. 94 ·1.69 1.69 l.40 1. 5 
A kansa 2.ta 2.16 2. 05 
.,.. 2.00 1.71 1. 51 1.57 1 • 
Cc.l iforni a . 45 2.28 2.17 2. 06 2. 00 2. 08 l. 76 1.8 
Cor orado 1. 98 1.92 1. 70 1.69 1.53 1. 47 1.49 .7 
Conn8 cticut 2.09 2. 09 2. 12 2. 12 2. 05 . :·/) . JJ . 8 
Delaware . 98 • 79 . 68 .66 .?3 . 60 .64 .7 
Fl orida 2. 27 2. 331 -:-ol 2.181 l. 771 l. 24 . 97 . 9 ... '-,I . 
Geor~ia 2. 0? 2.11 1.98 l. Sl 1.551 1.25 1.04 1. 2 
idaho 2.70 2. 53 ~.hJ 2.22 2. 09 2. 0 2 1.96 2. 0 
Illinois 2.70 1. 531 l. 701 1 ,.,1 • i..J. J . 79 • £35 L OS 1.0 
lndi na 1. 91 1. 97 1. 85 1.62 • 81 .54 . 59 . 7 
Iowa 1.85 2. 20 1 2. 1.+0 1 1.961 1.30 l. !.+ 2 l. 24 1.3 
Ken sas 2.20 2.09 2.10 2. 011 1.51 1. 2? 1.37 1.0 
l(entucky 2.32 2.18 2. 08 1.89 1.51 1.53 1.55 l.? 
Louisiana 2.70 2.70 2.70 2.1+4 1. 42 1. 55 1 . 84 1.6 
Maine 2.70 2.50 2.28 2. 09 1. 93 l. 74 1.64 1.7 
N!ary1and 2.70 2 .!..~.91 2. 281 2. o61 l. 21 1.21 1.19 1.1 
- --------
Lassachusett s 
lchir3an 
:.::innesota 
i "·'" ssi sslppl 
···isso r i 
Vontan.a 
lfebraska 
1'levada 
·New Hanj_) Shire 
~Jew Jersey 
t ew Hexico 
!'lew Yor k 
: orth Ca o ina 
lTorth D""kota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Ore:;on 
:2 ee1ns~rlva ia 
Rhode Isl and 
TABLE ~ ( cont.) 
Average :Empl oyer Contribution Rate ( Percen t) 
1942-'i:949, by -,State- ----· 
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 
1.52 1. 28 . 94 • 88 .. 38 1.13 
1. 69 i. 57 1.17 1.66 1.28 1. 65 
1. 95 2.29 1 2. 331 " ,.., 1 ::. • .:..3 1.64 1.09 
2. 70 2. 7() 2.70 2. 70 2. 70 2. 70 
1. 52 1.681 2. 021 1 . 931 1.17 1. 36 
2. 70 2.70 2. 70 2.70 2. 70 1. 75 
1.56 2. 02 1. 74 1. 30 00 .. // 1. J..j.o 
2. 70 2. 70 2.70 2.40 1. 93 1.68 
2.38 2. 21 1. 81 1.65 1.49 1.30 
1. 64 1. 87 1. 85 1.62 1.65 1. 83 
2.17 2.1', 1.97 l. 88 1. 83 1. 90 
2.70 2.70 2.70 1. 99 1. 81 2.17 
2.70 2. 65 2.44 2. 07 1.63 1. 52 
1. 95 l. 6 1. 64 1.54 l.ho 1. 54 
1.2) 1. 48 1.701 1.501 1. 261 • 82 
1.69 1. 801 1. 451 1. 2n1 1.011 1.06 
2. 41 2. 31 2. 23 l. 1. 73 l. Gl 
2. 70 2. 7') l. 22 1.27 1.2 . 99 
2. 70 2. 70 2. 70 2.70 2. 70 2.11 
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1948 1949 
----
1.31 1. 42 
1. 85 1. 8 
1.10 . 7 
2. 04 1.3 
1. 46 1.3 
1. 75 l . 
. 66 . 7 
1. 75 1.6 
1. 36 1. 6 
1. 54 1.1 
l. 79 1. 9 
l. 37 1.9 
1. 65 1. 4 
l. 70 l . ' 
. 70 . 8 
l. 23 1.2 
l. 70 1.7 
. 38 . 9 
1.44 1. 8 
So~th Carolina 
South Da ' t a 
Tenne see 
ex a s 
Utah 
Vermont 
vir ri nia 
~~ asl i '1 t on 
;Yest 'Jirginj_a 
'Nis o sin 
l;.~omin~.: 
T.'_BLE E cont . ) 
Avera'"'e Zmpl oyer Aontri bu tion Rate ( Percent) 
--1942- 1949 , by State . 
1 942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1747 
1. 98 l. 74 1. 86 1. 44 1.28 l. 29 
1.57 1.16 1.01 l.lJ . 93 1.18 
2. 70 2. 70 2. 6o 2.29 1.85 1.61 
1. 56 1. 1.+2 1. 24 . 92 • 89 . 95 
2. 70 2.70 2. 70 2.70 2.70 1.91 
2. 10 2. 38 2. 01 1. 80 l. 76 1. 59 
1. 59 1.50 1. 21 1.16 1.18 1.19 
2. 70 2. 70 2. 70 2. 70 2. 70 1. 92 
2.14 l. 76 1. 62 L J-~. l. 24 1. 32 
1. 55 .., 5<1 c. ..1 3 . 081 2. 041 . 54 .-99 
• 66 1. )3 , ....... 
-- • I LL4 l. L1 2 1.10 
79c 
1948 1949 
1. 26 . 1 
1.04 1.0 
1. 39 1.3 
. 98 . 9 
1.15 1.1 
1.5 1.3 
. 68 .7 
1. 89 . 7 
1. 36 1.3 
. 60 
1. 21 1.1 
l. I nc ·,1de eff ec t of war-risl;: ~A·'ltr.:..bu.tion s \ 
The fi :;ures refl ect the war r i slc contr .i.but ion prov1.sions Wh1.ch were I 
i n effect in 12 staLes at v~r<fing time s durin!i.: t he period 1943-46. Unde~ 11 
those _;:>rov l sions ta.'C rates in addition to orhigher than wo-.J.ld othcr;vise nave 
been assi gned u der exper ience rating wer e provided f or employers whose p ay-
rolls eXj_)aJ ded s harply during the war . The se provi sions were added a s fund 
_t:J rotecr.i..ve meas ures becausG o-" the heavy potential benefit 1 ia ll :itie s e-
pTe sented by wc..r-prod.J.ction irrns . 
TABLE ~ ( cont.) 
Average Empl oyer Cont.ri ution Rat e (Percen t) 
1J42-1949, ~ ~tate-
7 
I 
'Sot.lr ce : !-land. ook of Unemplo:) en I n surance , Finan ci al Dat ~ 1938-1949 , 
Depart ment of Lal::or, reau :) f "'~' .plo j'1nent Sec· ri ty , 
~·lashln ton , D. C. , Decenher , 1949 . 
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1 
hi ; h enough duri ng l ean years in order to a void a Fund crisis. The combina-
tion of a lack of war-risk contributions a'1d poor fl exibility of r ates ha s 
pla ced t he l!lassachusetts Fund in a ve r y em " rra s s in.a financial po s ition . 
a special stud~ on u.nemplo·. ment compensat ion done by Prof . 
1Wal-ver Ga.l enson of Harvard University for the D·' vision of Empl oyment Securit 
one of the major finding s can be summarized as follo·ws : The p ese t l ow 
i l evel of the state re erve must be attributed chiefly to t he l ov avera ge 
empl o re r cont.ri . ..tt ion rates that. have een co l lected durin.~ each year since 
1942 . I n all ut two :)·ears b~.:; ~.i.nnin;; ,rith 1942 the ·state average t""x rate 
I was sub stantially lower t . a:1 t _ ... t . O!' tf.l e co ntry a s a whole , en d in the 2 
I 
I years during which Massachus e t t s avera _ e t ax r ates were higher than those fo 
, t he countr,y a s ..... whol e , the differences between the two ·were very slight . 
Av rage Emplo;}re r Contribution Rate 
( per cent) .,..----
---- ·-==== 
--~--
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It is estimated that i f average empl o}er contr_;_ ut ion rates in Iassachus e tt s 
had e ilctlled those for the count ry as a whole i n eac year beginni n \vi th 
i 1942 , t" e tate Fund would have been ap1Jrvximw.tel y ~Jo , oo ,ooo. · eh er on 
December 31 , 1949, or equal to al::out 6.1~ per cen t of · axable wages i n stead 
I of 3. 3 pe r cent . Needl ess to sa.I t h<--t i f ave rage tax rates since 1942 had 
1 eq_tlalled those collected f or the co u.nt ry as a ·whol e , the substani tall y 
higher r e s erves that wo..1ld have been avail al:-l e a t the berinnin~ of 1948 
approximatel y 10% of t axable wage s ) wou.ld have made it .r-JOSs:.t.ble to i nance 
the e stima ted costs for the 8 year period ( t~1e hypotheti cal bu.sine ss cycl e 
' of 1948- )5 w ich Professor Gdlenson s e t up) 11fi t h much lo1~·er cont ribution 
1 ra t8 s L an (,bo s e now consld~red ·~. Gcessary . YV.Lt a reserve o. l Oib a t the 
bee..;.nnins o£' the per .i.o::l , the e3timu.ted co st for 1943-1955 , could have been 
financed with an ~verc. _,~e rat e of 2% even aft e r ma.ki ng an '-'.dequat e allowance 
_or r e3erves for estlmc;.t l 1::, e rr .)rs and un.foresee:-:~ contingen ci es .l 
rom the a"1ove in~o rmation it ce.n e seen t ha t ;:t mat eri al factor 
be lnd the dwindlin~~ und ha s been the r eduction in empl oyers 1 contribtl t ion 
raLe s . Sven if it be ac,mowled_;ed t hat the ide · of ex.,;erience ro.tin~ is 
rood ( an it is not w.cknowl e dged by t his ... cuthor ) , t.hen it mus t foll ow that 
th syste.n or f ormul a ln use in this sta~-,e i s i nc..de uate if the Fund could 
reach s uch a l ow poi nt ' :hen the experienc~ i n t.h e rest of t e country , v-1i th 
but ew exce1)tion s, J.S good . 
1. Com·TJOnwealth of Massachus ett s , Di vi sion of :2implo~rment Security, 11 • 
Re-~o rt 0:1 Une,nployrnent uO.uy··n sat ion Be:1efi t Co sts in :fassachus etts 11 , 
_r::o.r e uil.der genaral direction of Professor 'if at. ter Gal enson , P. 71 . 
I 
II 
'iihat do the newsp<:.pers , ins-1.cance compL.nies .:..nd ut i l ities ( h..1 si -
nes::;e s which usually pay t he mi ni:num cont ribution rate tmder experience 
-:-''---n ]1_ 5 een d. 11 c_ i seler . 11 The_, "' e'lt ; _0o o t ing about, contribu tion ..... J ~ s 
h.1vict~ been :too lo-w duri nG t.he v;ar ~{ea£'s ·g,_en employ>rs could h~- e v·,ell 
:...f for ed hi;her rate ::; . ~' hey ci.lso ment .i..:m no~J hin£ ubo:.Lt o r r t e3 having 
'been l m·.·e r than those for the COUntry :J. S a Wl"lo J. e . 'I'he~T do not recom:nend t he 
abol i tion of experience r:::.tin~ or at l east a revi sion to permit a di f .ferent 
3c ale of r - t es · .. ~u ch would ;ermi t hi; he r r .J.tes i ::' "1eces sary. Io , instead 
t.hey come out with an 11 e stimate " of ~~ 30 , or:.~o ,000. a year as the amount ein 
ill e~;aly tal n f r om the Fund by empl oy es ; - nJ t ey recommend plu6;in~ t he 
1
'l o c-p hol e s " on the empl oyees' side of t e ledge r . How the f i gur e of 
~3o , or o , ooo . was vsr arrived a t. will remain one of the unso ved mysteries . 
li;vidently ..i..t was s· _ _..;o.:;ed to be~ nice , l a rge , round L6ure that w uld s t i r 
i tlp the ire of t _e people , whi ch i s exac l u what i t did. T e bi ennial repor .. 
I of the .St at.e Advi so y Co'J.ncil differs great l' wi t h the ab s'J.rd est i mu.te o 1 
t·30,o_c ,ooo . i n fraudc1l en t. l"'a.- · .. 1Bnts of b2'1e fit~ tl a t h o. s been adviJ.r;.ced by J 
i "bn siness intere sts., >er oro ,L' "" ""' "·" this report. - r eel th~t i o .o.ld o:JI 
I v'is~ to l'lent..l.on thc..t t he Stat e Advisory Council is m~de up of 6 ne:n':>ers- -
1 12 represent i 'l.:-.; t he public , 2 repr esent i ng empl oyers, a::1 d 2 representin g 
I er!lplo ee s . In their epart of Janu.J. r y , 1951, they ment .l.oned , in a section 
1 
entitle "Detect i or1 of Ove rpayments" , t~a thro-.:1.;hout the past two ;rears, t he 
Di vis ion of i rnpl oyme· t .Secur ity ha s cont i nJ.ed i ts program f or the prevention 
·F======-=~---=~==-===-======================================,====~========== ==;~~ 
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and di covery of e rroneous or fraudJ.l ent paymen t s of enEdits . 1 t otal of 
: 15,795 new ovE:rp.J.yments on une.njJl oy·ment compen sation 'ilere established ~moil. t 
ing to ,·"784 ,936., whil e collection::3 by either cash or offset a.,:2 .:.n ·t 1-,c·-~':;.~ .!_+ 
c~trr-c:m tl,:r ()ayable totalled ~j; )+ 7b, 967. 25 . ome 186 i tems repre sentin~ CB , 04. 
oJ.tstandin ... bal ance at September 30, 950, f v-ere c:~.:1cel ed , eavin~ an 
! C447 ,671. 78. 1 Thi s f i:;ure is a far cry from the ~~~10 ,000 , 000 . t hat the news-
I 
paper s have claimed . .s a matter of fact i t is only 1.2% of the new paper 
' estimate . If this fi;; ur e :!.s compared 1'T.Lth the ? und bal ance , we find that t h 
.rJer centa:.;e is so s iP.all th:..t. it J.S ne;l lcible. Jnder experience r ati ng an 
iron ical si t uat ion exlsts th.:... t al most makes fraJ.dillent cl a i ms look c.l rlght. 
I If w9 coul d el iminate the small nw bs r of fraud"1 e::::·, cla.in:.s ~ tha t wou d c· .i.ve 
' tJhe c:nplo~re rs -'1 hett.er ernpl oJm nt ecord., -~·tll ich, under an exr,erie ce r c:.t .Lng 
S,\ ste.11 wo l d mean t hat their co'!'l.~r' .,_,utl on r::.tes might be lower; ::.herefore th 
f und l oses out ·:rhether it be by raud or experi ence r at in.:; . It mir;ht .::.c u-
ally tJa:-' , in terms of t "e Funri balan ce , to pe rr.'.it s ome _rc.ud in · rder to 
keep up the rat e s of empl oyers , especially when times are f airl- Goo d in the 
t hit t,here r.u.y t.hen - e suf:'icient unds f or a depression . J:f a law 
that permits r easoni ng l ike this , a s far f etched as it may po sihly 
in m:r •'3 sti r.ation t here is somet hing \~ro . (; wi t h the Law, and it sho'J. d oe 
cl:.a. ged. Drop exper i.ence ra.tin:; from the aw ;.:.nd even he remotes () i bi-
I l i t that t he above r eas onin.; is val· d is r ul ed out . 
Accordin::r t o the report by Professo. Gal enson , thinking in terms o 
the ::, r i.od 195 -55 , the F mel w ·n hi.!.ve o uil d 11p t o a l e vel of at l eas t 
l. House t· o . 216S , ~ iennhil Report of the State Jl.dvi sory Council , 
J anua!" 1 r:l ? . 1 8 . ----=====~==~~~~~~~~~======================================~======== 
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i $17J,ODO , OOO. bef ore ex'eri ence r a ting can he estor ecl. An even _:;reater 
i arr,oun t w.!.ll be necessary if benefits expended dt.J.rina an~- of the ~rear s 
i l 950 -55 exceed the mount expen ded in 1949 . With a un~fonn 2.7% tax in 
I effect, the maximum amount of con tr i but i ons w i 1 be roughly ~85 , 000 , 000 , 
1 Lin e s s em pl oyment trends prJ •t: ,;:uch rr.ore c. arabl e than anything tha t can ::;e 
fore seen , w o..1tl oc~ _or ··,ac'L..r. :. P f.''tnd bc:l ance of ~17 3,000,000. by 1 955 _;_s 
ooor .
1 Thi s :-neans tb..at u~ l •)S t he Law is ar.1en ed , ::.here i s not lL el y to be 
I ~x,'Jer j_eilce r .::. ting in ~tiel s sachu setr, s in t he near futu re . However, t he n evr 
\unempl oyment i nsurance bill sponsor ed mo.inl y by business i nte r ests 'fill 
I 
I <:tt te1npt to retain experience r~ tiny and br J.ng _;_t back into e f fect a s soon e:. s 
: 1)ossible at the expens e o the 'NOrking man . It is the hope of ;{our aut ho r 
t hat th bi ll will no pass . 
Many _Jeopl e have overl co:ke the fact that the strt:cture of i n 'ustr;-y 
land i ndctstrial pr cL ctices in Massachu. etts do no t permit the une11ployment 
i,1 sur<.e.n~e fund to be .J_ ,e ._,at ely fi 1.<"n ced hy dnyt hi ng l e ss than 2. 7% . The 
1foll owing is proof of this tatement . 
The de c i ne i n err.pl oyment .:.. n the man f c.cturing industrie s in t e 
iJn.L t e t.....tes f or the period 1943 t o 1949 ha s 'Neighed more heavil upon 
1
: assachtlsett s than i hc:s f .Jr tl1e !1.:.. tion a s a whol . ere was a dec i ne o!: 
12 ;; in ompl oy:nent in the ma.1u.f <":.. '-' tm:·i . "'~ J.nduttr:i:e s of I'•f:assachu se t t s, in con-
1t.ras t a drop i n Uni t ed ·sta t e s e .. ploymen t of only 18 .6%. In 1949 a 
I ____ __ _ 
1. 'Ju.lenson , op . cit., P. 19 
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rece ssion year , employment in manu factlJ.ring industries in Massachusett s 
showed a decline of 10.7% frcm the level of the p revious year whe r e.:::. s the 
decline for the Jnited States as a whol e was 7 . 4% . · 
J1inployment in r1lm uL.cturing Indu.strie s 
Year Mass ~ u. s. 
1943 835,600 17,381,000 
1944 798 , 800 17 ,111,000 
I 191-l-5 734, 6oo 15,302,000 
I 
I 1946 
73~ , 9rJO 14, 461, 000 
I 1947 742, 600 15 , 247,000 
1948 729' 300 15, 286 ,000 
1949 651, 200 14., 146' 000 
It has been claimed that Massachusetts has a mature economy; 
i. e ., Massachusetts is highl y ~rbanized and industrial i zed and can expect 
to lose empl oyment i t its manufact u ring ind u.st rl e s via e;r e::...ter competition 
from outside the state and an out-mi grat ion of some of i ts industries. It 
1 has been evident sinc e ~'lor d War I that manufac t ur ing industries i n i{a s s-
1 . I a chu se t ts have been l o slng empl oyment mor e r e::.pidl y t han t hose in t he rest of 
t he count ry . The result of t hi s situat i on is str,lctural unemplo;yment which 
compels workers to draw unemployment com1Jen sat ion until they are a bl e t o find 
empl oyment in ot her industries . 
Although there has been an expansion in em!Jl oymen t i n t ertiary 
I i ndustri e s and con.'3trJ.ct ion in "~ssachusetts ( see table below) , t his ha s no t 
I 
I 
Employment1 - - Conatruction 
Massachuse t ts 1943-1949 
1943--36, 000 
1944--32,)00 
1945--36,600 
1"'46--57 , 300 
1947--63 ,600 
1948-~69,)00 
1949--60' 900~~ 
~~ R1sed on data for first 6 months only. 
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l. Com uted from data obtained a t Massachusetts Division of Employment Secur, 
ity . 
Emplo~rment in Tertiary I ndustries~ 
in Hassachusetts 1943-191.J.9 
1943--529' 200 
1944- -533 ,000 
l:;l~6--h2l ; 200 
1947--647 ,000 
1948--648 , 400 
1949--641 ,000 
1 {~ Computed from · ata o'ot~ined at !·Aassachuset ts Division of Employment Secur 
I ; t:.-
====iL-
offset the decline i n manuf2.0t J.rin eTnpl oyme1 t which is continuing and in 
all p r obu.bility will contin~e in the f ut ur e .· :)me ..... s.s~.i.t.ance can be ob t ained 
in copin~ vrith unempl oyment .)y a continuin~ ex ansion i n the :.:.ertiary indus-
tries . However : it should be noted t at lndustrie s such as pro:'e s s l onal 
ser v lee s, educati on , bankin,; and i nsurance can do l i t t.l e to help unemploy -
ment in :11anufacturin "' indc1stries s i n ce they r e4.uire special ized trai. ni r..g 
that r.1anu£'acturing err. l oye e s do not have . Al so , t _1ere is the que stion of 
how much mo re can tertiary i ndustr ie s in Mass a c husetts expand ? 
The situation in the man c. cturi no- i ndust rie s has pL.ced reat fin-
ancial st r e s s upon the unempl oyment Compensu. tion Fund . Also , t he 1Jre sence 
of a rel· t i ve y l arge roportion of femal e wo r kers in manufacturing i ndus trie 
in I1as sachus etts, pr actically all of them covt::: red by the lJnemplo en t insur-
u.nce sf stcm , c r eate s spe cia problems tha t weig heavi l y upon th e ~ . und . On 
t.lJe .: . .rGrace , Yf.)men ave a L;sse·~ ~ e.;::r ee o.f vttachmen t to the labor rnc.rket 
than men , ue to t : e pat tern of amil y life prevailing i n our so cie t y . The i 
eoployrnen t is l ikel y to be more int.ermit <~ent , an d more of them wi l l tend - o 
e i n the rnargina abo orce that is so costly to the Unempl oyment Insu r -
ance system . For exampl e , i n 1949, 40% of Unempl oymen t j_ns urance claiman ts 
in ~.:as sachusetts wer e women , whil e the ra.tio of f ema.le 1 bor to t otal l a.bo r 
force was only 35%. 
One of the i ndustri al practices in Massachuset t s that is worth 
noting f or the purpose of t hi s paper is job rota.t ~on , whi ch is a direct 
1 outgrowth of the continui n,; decline in manufacturin£ empl oyme t . Job 
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rotation '.'ras pr acticed in the La:vrrence ·worsted Mill s long before the Unem-
I 
1 ploy ment Compensation Law wa s enact ed . 
\ 1Jro uct s of 
i 
The nature of the demand for the 
the i ndustry made it desirable to maintain attached to the 
industry a l aoor force to meet peak operating requirements . One method of 
a ssuring t his attachment was to rotat e vm r ker s on available jobs. The intro-
\ duction of Unempl oyment Com.t>e:nsc:..t. .wn , by reducing t l:le wage l oss to t he 
I 
1 ro t ated worker J r ovided a f .1rth""r re~'3CJD for continuance of the syc;tem . I t 
I is not difficult to ap LJ rec i at c: tha t for the insured worksr , job rotati on tied 
in with Unemployment Insurance provides a l arger annual income t han other 
I 
lmet'10ds of wor<:: sharing, e. g . reduction of the . wo rk ·week or of hours Yro ked 
Rota.tion of wor ke rs ensure s that all members of t he :rotated wor k 
iforce 'lvill share e'-i J.ally i n empl oyment and unemployment . With unemploY-Jlen, 
spread over the entire rotated f orce , the ave r a;e duration of unel!!pl oyment 
,will be l e ss than i.f unem1jloy·nent were concentrc.ted on a frac t ion of the 
! force~ Th eref ore, the prohJ.b..i.l i t y of benef ..i. t exhaustion i s reduced. For a 
!benefit year , 46% of <.l. rowted force could be idle each week with.Jut the 
\members ~xhaust..i. ns; t hei r benef l ts, a. ssumin r.r each man is 
iof benefl t s. 
I 
I 
en titled to 23 weeks 
I The excess cost o.: rotc:..tion is partly offset l:>y the fact t 1a t the 
/t ot al >rai t ing 1Jeriod Lmemplo~,rmot .t of c>. 1·otated force i s Greater that t he 
r;aiti ng period unemployment that exi sts when only a ,oortion of the vork force 
I 
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1 share s t.he unemployment , On the other ha.nci , men sub ject to indef inite l ay-
off .;:;.re likley to ;:; ee k other V!O r !:, ':·~~iil e rotated men do. not. 
The virtue of rotation from the viewpoint of the worker is that it 
provides maximum compensation for unerr.ploymen t , since there wi11 be no 
exhau stion un ess unem!Jl oyment is very severe . It is this aspect of rota-
tion that makes it potent ial1y co stly t o an Unemployment Compensat.ion system. 
r.1oreover , rotation tends to hold ai:.t-.:~.ched. t o an i ndustry a surp1us 1abor 
suppl Y, and the more rotated Ymrke r s there u. r e relative t o u.vaih'l:lle jobs, 
the hi ,:;her will be the cost _or any ~ iven · anount of unemployment.l 
I vmuld like to quote 2 passage s from 'Se:yl!1our E Harris 1 11New 
, .;!;n .;1 and 1 s Decline i n the Ame rican Economy" that also bear out the )Oi n t tha t 
i~he structure of industry in Has sachu setts requires a contribut ion rate 
hi P"h er t han t hat all owed under exper ience r a t ing . 
"In summar J , all indexes relating to ;IJew EnGland' balance of 
payments point to "'n..:orlj"i~1~ weaknes3es . Her l arge dependence on 
111anu f· cturing exports is unfortunc:~t e since her .:osition i n illanu-
:Lc.Ctllrins tend s t o ued2.ne . r:avlng to pc.;{ f or her l are; e i :nports 
of food and rav~ ma(.eri ~l s , ' Tew l:;ngland rel i e s heavil;I on intere st 
a~1d ,;rofits from past lnve stment.o ont 3ide New England and to some 
extent on services. I n an age when ne t r eturns f rom capic, al l st 
income are declining , the capa.ci t:· to pay f or excess imports is to 
some ext.ent impa.Lred. I n view of r1ew .C:ngl and 1 s industrial decline , 
i n view of the setbacks suffered );i capital i sm; i;· view of t e ne t 
Treasury drains from this area , in view of the rapid growth element 
elsewhere, it i s no surprise t hat New England 's share of the 
country ' s r,one t ary suplJlies ha s declined over the l ast genera tion . 
Let us repeat : a r egion, l ike an .i..ndivid,lal, ca~ become i mpover-
ished if it buys too much and sells t oo l ittle . 11 
l. ,Jalenson, op. cit., Pp 38-39 . 
2. Harvard Busines o Review, Spring , 1).1.7, P. 356 
11 Jew Engl and is not developing new industdes rapidly enoujh to 
take the place of tottering one s . She is contributing heav .ily 
to the supr.iort of the South and West , and is not sh owin;; sufficient 
interest in s;e~tl.nG her share of government expen itures f0r social 
security, investment, c;.g ricultur e , and so on. Nor does I ew :2::ngl and 
sell enough to dher regions ; she leans too heavily on the dead and 
of the past--capitalist income. nl 
These facts apply to ¥assachusetts as well a s the rest of :lew 
1 Engla11d . Therefore, we can e:.<:p8ct unem;_Jl oyment to be hi;_;her here than in 
! 
! other sections of the country. An attempt to cut into v•orkers ' benefits is 
no solut ion, for i t doos nor, attac)( the ca.use of the dilemna. Unl ess the New 
~ngJ.and ec;)nom;,r can be re-vitalized , ex;erience ratin~ must be abolished or 
1 revised so that i:h e fu.nd wi 11 b~ :::r'equa te t o meet claims of the unemj_)loyed . 
I 
i I n ccnclusion, all t he actaal evidence shows that ·t is not the 
I employ·ee s who are t0 blame for the dwindling s ize of the Unemployment Campen-, 
1 sation Fund. The precarious _tJo sit.ion of" t he Massachusetts Fund at the 
iJresent tine does not mean that insol vency is necessarily inevitable. f3ut it 
is e·vident that the structure of i ndustry and industrial prc.ctices make 
I 
1
Hassachusett s a rela.tively high cost Unempl oyment Insurance state, and the 
jproba. l e rat:.c of unemployment in the Commonwealth can hardly he finance by 
kJ.x rates below those o.f the Jnited States d.nd definitely not by tax r a tes 
Iunder the exper i ence rating s ,rstem now in effect in Massachusetts. 
! 
Ha.rvard BLlslne0s Review, op. cit. P. 370 . 
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CHAPfER V 
SUM1vlARY AND CONCLU$ION5 
The first attempt to make use of experience rating was i n Great 
Britain when i n 1 9 20 an act was passed which permi tted "insura ce by 
industry. 11 This r el a ted contribution and de gree of risk i n the i ndustry . 
jr he plans of only two i ndu strie s 1ere accepted . The government f elt that it 
aul d have been the industrie s with the least risk of unemploym.ent that 
oul d :no s t likel y have taken advantdge of the provision of the la 'f; this was 
regarded a s undes irabl e vrhen depression was conti nuing and the i nsurance 
was inadequate to a~{ the benefits promised. The government, t he r e fore, 
notice t hat no exten sion of the principl e of insurance by industry would 
I e approved as lo ng as the emer gency s ituation existed, and late r abol ished 
i[he right of an indust~f to establ i sh a separate f und . 
Germany a lso toyed with the experience rating problem. The first 
erman unemployment insurance law authorized rate dlfferentiat ion by 
geo~ raphical dist r ict s. 'fhe scheme was soon found t o be unwo rkable ~ because 
wrkers a nd empl oyers i n s ome a r eas ·would have been forc e d to pay · rr..pos sibl y 
t
_igh contributlOn rat e s. Occupational r ate differen t i ation vras tr1.ed next. 
he impracticabil ity of this scheme became evident ,_.t once. It was certain 
hat some occupational groups woul d be burdened vvi th an intolerable contri-
.utionrate i f the pl an for occupational experience r ati ng were carried 
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through. Finally, the administrators of the unemployment insurance system, 
as in Gn~at Britain , believed that any rate differentiation woul d have under-
mined tJhe r:;.nances of the pl an , and since 1930 experience rating has not been 
an i -·sue there. · 
In the lJn..i..ted States merit rating was endorsed i n principle by 
President Roosevelt in 1935. The Social Security Bill, a s passed by the 
House o.f Repr e sentati'!JJe s , would not have pe r mitted any merit rating in 
state unemployment compensa tion laws. The bill as finall;:- passed by Congre ss 
ho'W'Je r , contained authorization for merit rating. 
The irst stat e to make use of merit rating was Wisconsin. Early 
r es ult s of the system showed that although some stabiliz""tion had been 
accomplished by merit. ratins unde r the Wisconsin I-1. ct, the Act tended to 
stabilize unde r empl oyment a11d o.d.J.ed somewhat to the volume of total 
!unempl oyment. 
I n Mas sachus ett s, merit rating, although enacted i n 1939, became 
operative , in so far as reduced rates to empl oyers were actually in effect , 
as of January 1, 1942. 
B,' 1948 ev12ry state had some t ype of merit rating provision it its 
unemployment insurance law. Ehere are f i ve distinct experience rating 
s ',' st,ems--the pa:;rroll decline, compensable-separat i ons, r eserve-ratio, benefi t 
!ratio , and benefit-wage r&.t..i..o plans. Some states u se a combi nation of the 
sy stems. 11 the plans have certain thine;s in common in spite of essential 
:1.2..ffe rences. They are all devised t o establish the relative experience of 
!individual . employers with unemployment or benefit costs. To this end , all 
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have act.ors for measuring each empl oyer 1 s experi ence with unemployment or 
benefit expenditure and all compare thi s experience with a measure of 
exposure--·u.sually pCJ.yroll s--to establi sh the rel ative experience among 
employers . However , the five plans dJ. fer 3reatly in the construction of the 
formulae, in the f CJ. ctors used to measure experience , and the met hod of 
measurement , in the number of -ear s over which the expe r ience i s recorded , 
in presence or a sence of ot.her f actors, and in the rel ative weigh t given the 
various ~actors in the final assignment of r~te s . 
Massachusett s makes use of the benefit-wage r atio plan , which i s a 
modification of the "Texas Plan " or the "Cliffe Pl an 11 of experi ence rat ing . 
A fundamental difficult. : with t hi s formula and any formula ba s ed upon 
benefits charged is t.he i mpo s 3ibility of allocati ng the r esponsibility for 
unemployment to specific empl oyers. Mcny puz;zl ing questions have arisen on 
this matter such as-- i s an empl oyer less responsibl e for unemployment if the 
worker happens to ;1,e t a job after receiving one weekl y benefit check; has t h 
employer caused more unempl oyment if the workers whom he l aJ s off a r e 
un ortllnate enough to remain une;nployed and draw benefit s for several weeks? 
Ana t.her difficul t ',r encountered is the problem of what the primar y f unction of 
expe r ience r a t inG shoul d be. Shoul d i t be t he attainment of empl oyment 
stab ili t y or the allocat ion O .L benefit cost s'? I f the a nswer i s empl oyment 
stability , what is the proper way of measuring it? :Should i t be in terms of 
changes i n the number empl oyed , i n man hours of emplo~.rment, or in total 
payrolls? The dual aims of experience r ating make impossibl e the selecti on 
of a measure ::>- employers ' experience as well as the f ormulati on of a me t hod 
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of as signing r ates that would at the same time distribute the cost of 
benefits and st imulate employers' efforts to stabil ize • 
• '\. genuine merit r at ing system would measure the exact deg ree of 
regular employment a ch ieved by a given employer a s a r e sult of the incentive 
tax. However , nei t -1er t.he mer i t rating system in Mas sachus etts nor those of 
any other state s take into account the degree of co ntrol which the individual 
employ.ar has over the volume of employment or unemployment. Al merit r &ting I 
systems give t he l owest r at e to naturally stable industries , irrespective of 
an.r effort s to give more regular emplo;)'ment. They impose t h e h i ghest rates 
on i ndustries by nature unstable , irre spect:;_v.e of any achievement s made i n 
\giving more r egular empl oyment. 
It i s undoubtedly true t hat tangible advantages accrue to indivi-
dual empl oyers (besides a r eduction i n contribution rates) and employees 
when employment is regularized. Indeed, the v alue of r egularized employmen t 
to those qi r ectly benefiting is such that one may wonder why an incentive 
1 ~ax is requir ed to bring about r P.gul arization. 
Merit r ating has be come a device f or letting the ot.her fel low pay. 
I T'his i dea is called "the allocati on of the social cost . 
11 
'.'ho shouts l et the 
lpther fellow pay? 'fhose industrie s , of course, which are by their nat ure not 
sub ject to rapid change in consumer habits, s uch as, for example, the utllit -
-es which have been granted a monopoly, the publishers of gr eat newspapers or 
periodicals, the banks, insurance companies , and certain large manufacturing 
I 
:- rusts or ca rtels. 
There is a fundamental que s tion of fiscal policy involved in the 
ontroversy concc:rninc, meri t rating. Under existine; prov isions, there is a 
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serious uestion whether variable tax rat es will gi ve as much .Ln contribution 
as 2 uniform rate of 2 . 7%. This i s an important quesi:.ion of fiscal pol .Lcy 
oecau se a ;y-ield of at l east 2. 7% _;_s necessary if we are to have a compre-
hen sive and socially adequa.te system of unemployment compensation . Experience 
rating should not be used a s a device for an ove r - all tax r eduction . It is 
almost certain, however , that if a number of employers are to get a r a t e of 
• 5% , yields equal to 2 . 7% will necessitate inc r e asing the tax on empl oyers 
with an unfavorqble experience considerably above 4%. As a matter of fac t, 
the a llocation o.f cost therby should , logic-.llY, require that an employer 
with a bad experience pay a rate nece s sa r y to take ca r e of the unempl oyment 
occurring in his particular enterpri s e . Such a rate , carr led to its 1o2; i cal 
extreme, might well be 7 or 8% in the construction industry and in certain 
other capital -goods industrie s ·. 
While admitting the value of regularized employment within indi-
vidual pl ants , the social value of r egularized empl oyment may be questi oned . 
The task of showing that _egularization of employment can be of r eal val ue t o 
individual s and at the same time an undersirable 1Jol.Lcy from the viewpoint of 
the community as a whol e is difficult . However , the r e are general economic 
; rounds on which the so cial desirability of regularization can be chal lenged • 
.itegul arized employment t ends to create not. onl y a group of reglll arl y employed 
individuals but also a group of individuals who never have 'j obs. Also , 
reglllarizati on will tend to reduce the number of jobs. By penalizing 
employers whenever a worker draws benefits, emplo; ers are constrained to c t 
1'10 rking forces to a minimum and to delay expansion of empl oyment . Vlhil e such 
a pol icy may aid those who retain jobs, it is not, a rational l abor market 
l 
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pol icy to restrain the expansion of empl oyment. Any pl an of experience 
rating offers employers incentives to reduce their taxe s regardl ess of their 
regulci r i zat ion of empl oyment. Any device through which an employer can 
dismiss worke r s under conditions whic c rende r t hem i neligible for benefit s 
is a perfe ctly l egal means of circumv en t ing the intent of the experience 
rating provisions , e. g ., hir ing students to cope with summer production . 
Al thollgh the anticipated t c:;.x reduction will stimul a te re~ularization in 
some pl ant s, th8re is littl e po ss ibi l ity that ex1Jerience r a t ing will r osul t 
in chs.nge s in em l oyment pract. .:.. c e s that will s ignl i cantly affect l ci r ge 
po rtions of the l abor market in t he l ong run . ·rne inexorable ressure of the 
hJ.siness cycl e wil l continue to force expan sion or contraction of income s 
and jobs. 
Oppone_t s of experience rat ing argue that no employer ha s an 
equi tabl right to a reduced r.;.te if his withdrawals from the fund are l ow 
J beca~ se unemplo~ent is not caused by individual empl oye rs and a flat contri-
bution r ate i s t.herefore more equitabl e \jhc..n a different ial rate . Also , 
the r e is sllch a gr eat interdependence of industry that any attempt to 
allocate responsibility t o indiv ldual empl •Jyers is fu.tile . The r i sk of any 
s u.ch at. t empt is s J seve r e t hat ~rovls lon for benefit s can soundl y be made 
onl y bJ commu.nit .' -'Nide s haring of t he risk. 
L1 the past the GX_tJe r ience r ating idea focused graatly on the 
desirc.bility of redc1cing cont r ibution r ::tte s in view of l a r ge reserves in many 
state s. The .fact i s, however , that high reserves in many si:,ates were cau sed 
by V8ry l ow standards of benefit payment s and in part by relativel y f avorable 
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employment experience . .?urther:nore , a ccur:mlation of r eserves daring t ime s 
of relat ively good e r.1.plo,:;ment ma;r be but a normal and antic i pated r e sul t of 
the dec.L s ion to f inance benef its in t::unes of poor employment b:.r the accumJ.-
lation of funds in good t ime's. 
It must be remembered that unemployment insurance ser-ve s as a 
br.3.ke in eme r sencies. The first stimulus that can be given at the s tart of 
a de_r:Jre ssion is o. ' J..Lck increase in -:.he nation's purchasi ng power . -~ large 
reser ve or benefit pa}ment poo under a so ci ally a.deq11ate unemployment 
i!l.sur::.nce sy8tem could put several mi l lion doll ars into circulat ion long 
before any pror;ram such as public works, for exampl e , coul d even get into 
o eration . 
Unempl oyment insuran.ce a nd e8pecially merit rating are approaching 
t he crisis wh ich m:..~.y determine whethe r the sysc.em as it now exi sts can 
s :.tr v .i.. ve . Gr owin:; frictions within t,he system are, in part , t.he cause of the 
pre3ent mal .J..dy . p,)werf ul groups of empl oyers c..re seeking to J.se experience 
r at i ng a s a device f ,)r ar1 over-all tax redJ.ction. Large labor organization s 
are b e comine; incre.:~.sinr;ly dissatisfied with this dev ice. The :So c ial -Security 
Board and stat.e ddmi!l.istrc...tors are begmning to feel t.he l)re s sures of these 
conflioting ~roups . 
At present, .~assachusetts is faced with a crisi s. Be cau se the size 
of the fund in thi8 8tate windl ed to a f igure lower than the amount of 
!benefits paid in 1949 , exper ience rating 
dwindling bal ance in the fund h::.s caused 
has been tempor a ril y abolished . The 
much concern i n Massachusetts , and 
many r easons have been sug __ ested and many solJ.tions offered . . The gr-eatest 
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pressure , however , is being brought to bear by big business interest in an 
attempt to r e s tore experience rating in the near f~ture. Their method is an 
attem t to throw the blame on the workers by claimin"" that they have chi -
selled from the fund unt il it, has dwindl ed to it s present balance. They are 
attempting to shed the bl ame from themsel ves , and pl 3.ce it squo.rely upon the 
sho ulders of the worhngmen of thi s state . A fanta stic f igure of ~v30 , OCO , 000 
a year has been "drawn from Lhe blue " and decla red to be the amount tha t 
•ror},e rs "steal " from the fund each year . However , they negl ect to mention 
anything about thei r own side of the l edger . Empl oyers , via experience ratine 
rave deprived the fund of approximatel y $330 , 000 , 000 from 1942-1949 . For the 
~a11e period of time there has al so been a s aving s to empl oyers of approxi-
nately t>l Ol,OOO, OOO due t o the $3 , 000 l imit on wages. So it can be seen 
~hat from 1942-1949 employer s have "robbed " the fund of $431,000,000 which 
· s almo st twice the amount of their t otal cont.ributions f or the sarne period of 
f.' i me . 
If Mas sachu setts employers had at least paid the same c::mtrlbution 
~ate as that for the United 'State s as a whole , the fund woul d be in a much 
)ett:.er position than it is now . The fund would be $100 , 000 , 000 r icher . 
It s'1oul d be remembered that the , ears 1 <)42-1949 ·were .1 ears of 
pros peri t ;r when er.r l iJyers coul d easily have affo r ded the extro. t ax bur den . 
he extra f u ds collected coul d have c..cted asa cu shi on for pos s ibl e fu t ure 
epression. 
2thi cally speaki ng , e 1npl oy ers had no right to experience r ating 
during the war year s. Experience rating , or a reducti on in the tax r ate is 
supposed to be a rev;:<.rd for stab.i.llzat.ion of employment. Due to a shortage 
of labor sup.:->l Y and an increased der:1and, especiall y b ;r the government, we 
were in a state of full empl oyment . l!:mployers, themselve s, had no direct 
effect on this le el of employment and therefore should not have reaped the 
harve st of a reduction in contributio rate s. However , they we r e gi ven that 
r edu.ction i n Massachusetts and readily accept ed it. Now they should b e 
read.:..l y willing to pay the c onsequu 1ces which is the abolition of expe r ience 
rating because of t he unsound financial structure of the Unemployment 
C~mpensation Fund in this state. 
Empl oyer s must remember that the struct u re of i ndustry and i ndus-
trial practice s in Massachusetts do not permit the Unempl oyment I ns·..1ran c e 
Fund to be adequately financed by experience rating. We can expect 
unemplo~rment t o be higher here than in other sect ions of the country. An 
a t te.npt to cut i nto workers' beneL .. t s is no solution , fo r it does not attack 
the cause of t he dile~na . unl ess the economy of this state can be r e -
vital i zed , expe r ience rating must be abolished so t hat the f und vrill be 
adequate to meet the claims of the ll.nempl oyed . 
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APPENDIX A 
EXPERIENCE-RATING PROVISIONS OF THE 
MASSACHU:SEI'TS EMPLOY1~ENT :SECURITY LAW 
Each employer shall make contributions for each year at the 
~pplicable rate as set forth in this section, on so much of his Flfroll as is 
~ubject to thi s chapter; provided, that he shall make contributions only on 
r~hat part of remuneration paid by him to an individual not in excess of three 
f housand dollars with respect to employment during any calendar year. 
(a) "If no rate of contribution under subsection (b) 
of this section ap~lies, each employer shall 
make contribution for each year at the rate of two 
and seven tenths percent of his payroll ; provided, 
that he shall make contributions only on that part 
of the remuneration paid by him to an individual 
not in excess of three thousand dollars with 
respect to employment during any year. 
(b) (1) "For each calendar year, commencing after 
three immediate preceding consecutive calendar 
years throughout which he has been charged 
or could have been charged with benefit wages, 
the contribution rate of such employer shall 
be determined as hereinafter provided. 
(2) '~hen, i n any calendar year, beginning not 
earlier than nineteen hundred and thirty~nine, 
a worker is paid benefits for the first 
to the benefit year to which the claim applies, 
his wages from each employer during his base 
period shall be termed "worker 1 s benefit wages" 
and shall be treated for the purpose s of this 
subsection as if they had been paid in the year in 
which the first week of benefits is paid. 
11Worker 1 s benefit wages" when used with respect 
to benefits paid for the first compensable week 
of unemployment on claims originally arising 
in the year nineteen hundred and thirty-nine or 
in the years nineteen hundred and forty, nine-
teen hundred and forty-one, nineteen hundred 
and forty-two and prior to April first, 
nineteen hundred and forty-three, shall include 
the wage s not in excess of one thousand dollars 
in those quarters upon which the benefits avail-
able to the claimant were computed, assignable 
to its respective year of nineteen hundred and 
thirty-nine to nineteen hundred and forty-three, 
inclusive, in accordance with this subsection. 
For the purpose s of this subsection , and 
effective as of April first, nineteen hundred 
and forty-three, benefit wages charged against 
each employe r shall include only that part of 
wages not in excess of twelve hundred dollars 
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paid by him in a base period; provided, that 
on and after April first, nineteen hundred and 
forty-five and prior to April first, nineteen 
hundred and forty-six, benefit wages charged 
against each employer shall include that part 
of wages not in excess of sixteen hundred 
dollars paid by him in a base period; and pro-
vided, further, that on and after April first, 
nineteen hundred &nd forty-six, benefit wages 
charged against each employer shall include 
that part of wages not in excess of nineteen 
hundred dollars paid by him in a base period. 
( 3) "The 1 employer 1 s benefit wages 1 for a given 
calendar year shall be the total of the benefit 
wages of all his former workers' ·assignable to 
such employer and to such calendar year in 
accordance nith paragraph (2) hereof. 
(4) "The benefit wage ratio of each employer for a 
given calendar year shall be a percentage equal 
to the to t al of his benefit wages for the three 
most r ecently completed calendar years, divided 
by that part of his total payroll for the same 
t hree years, with respect to which contributions 
have been paid ·to the division on or before 
January t hirty-first of the successive calendar 
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years, respectively, or, in the alternative, 
on or before the date, but not later than 
March thirty-first., in any event, to which 
extension for such payment shall have been granted. 
(.5) "For any calendar year the 1 state experience 
factor' shall be a percentage determined by di-
viding the total benefits paid from the common-
wealth's benefit account during the three most 
recently completed calendar years by the total 
bwnefit wages of all employers during the same 
three completed calendar years, provided that 
any fractional percentage resulting therefrom 
shall be raised to the next higher multiple of 
one per cent. The state experience factor shall 
be determined for edch year prior to March 
thirty-first thereof. 
(6) "The contribution rate for each employer for a 
given calendar year shall be determined and the 
employer notified thereof not less than ten days 
prior to the due date of the first contribution 
for the year. It shall be determined from the 
following table (see page ' b ) on the same line 
as the cur rent state experience factor and shall 
be the rate appearing at the head of the lowest 
numbered column in which appears a percentage 
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equal to or in excess of such employer's bene-
fit wage ratio. If no percentage equal to or 
in excess of such benefit wage ratio appears 
on said line the employer's contribution rate 
shall be two and seven tenths per cent but not 
in excess thereof. 
(c) "For the purpo se of determining the benefit YTage 
ratio of an employing unit not previously subject 
to this chapter which has or shall become subject 
to thi s chapter by reason of having t aken over and 
continued in the same trade or business all of the 
employing enterprises of an employer or employers, 
the contribution record of the predecessor 
employers and the record of workers' benefit 
wages which were charged or would have been 
charged to the predecessor employers, if no trans-
fer of the employing enterprises had occurred, shall 
cease to be the records of the predecessor employers 
and shall become part of the records of the suc-
cessor employing unit, if the successor employing 
unit shall have given to the director notice of 
the transfer of the employing enterprises and a 
guaranty of payment of all contributions required 
of the predecessor employers in the form and 
manner prescribed by the director; provided, that 
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if the successor employing unit is a receiver, 
trustree, executor administrator or other officer 
under designation or approval of a court for the 
purpo ses of carrying on pending liquidation or 
reorganization a~ such, he shall not be required 
to gQarantee payment of the contributions requi red 
of his predecessor employer. 
"Any successor employing unit which shall have filed 
the required notice and guaranty with the director 
shall receive the benefit of this subsection from 
the date of the transfer of the employing enter-
prises, or from the first day of the quarter which 
shall have begun not more than five months before 
the required notice and guaran~y shall have been 
filed with the director, whi chever shall have 
occurred the later; provided, nevertheless , that 
a successor employing unit which has or shall be-
come subject to this chapter by virtue of having 
taken over the employing enterprises of two or 
more emplo:rers, in connection with the consolida-
tion of such employers into the successor employing 
unit, shall receive the benefit of this subsection 
only from the first day of January following its 
filin g of the required notice and guaranty with 
the di rector, and in the interim shall make 
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contributions at the rate of two and seven tenths 
per cent. 
"The provisions of this subsection shall not 
aut horize the refund of any moneys except in 
accordance with section eighteen; but where a suc-
cessor employing unit which files the required no-
tice and guaranty has paid contributions at a higher 
rate than required under the provi sions of this sub-
section, the director shall issue to such employer 
credit memoranda against future contributions. 
Such credit memoranda shall be personal to the 
employer to whom i ssued and shall not be ass igned 
orencoumbered, or be subject ot trustree or mesne 
process. 
"The provisions of this subsection shall not apply 
where an employer acquires the employing enter-
prises of another employing unit. 
(d) "I f the unemployment compensation fund available 
for benefits becomes less than the amount of the 
benefit expense in that year of the most recent 
calendar years not exceeding ten in which the high-
est benefit expense was paid the director and 
council shall make a declaration to that effect. 
Effective the quarter following such declaration, 
the lowest four rates of employer contri bution shall 
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each be advanced one half of one per cent, and the 
two end one half per cent rate advanced to two and 
seven tenths per cent. Should such unemployment 
compensation fund after such increased rates have 
been in effect for two or more calendar quarters 
continue to be less than such highest benefit ex-
pense for such calendar year, the director and 
council shall so declare. Effective the quaeter 
following such announcement, all employer contri-
bution rates shall be raised to two and seven tenths 
per cent of such pay roll as is subject to this 
chapter. Whenever such unemployment compensation 
fund becomes more than an amount equal to one and 
one half times the amount of such highest benefit 
expense for such calendar year, the rates in the 
table shall become effective the quarter following 
the declaration by the director and council. 
(e) "Any employer may apply to the director for a 
review as to the determination of his benefit wage 
ratio, provided such application is filed within 
one year of the date of such determination. nl 
1. Massachusetts Employment Security Law, Chapter 151A 
of the General Laws, Section 14 
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ABSTRACT 
Experience rating is not an idea that was conceived in this 
country. Great Britain and Germany both exper.:imented with the idea before 
t his collntr? even had an unemployment insurance law. The plan was soon 
found to be un successful by both countries, and it was dropj,-ed from the law 
in order t o protect the benefit fund and to prevent some industries from 
paying outrageously high tax rates. 
The United States incorporated experience rating in its unemploy-
ment insurance law and by 1943 every state had some type of merit rating 
provision. There are five distinct experi ence rating systems in u se in this 
countr-y--the pa~lroll decline , compensabl e-separat ions, reserve-ratio, 
bene.fit~ratio , and benefit-wa~e ratio plans. All tJhe plans have certain 
things in common in spite of e ssential differences. They: are all devi sed to 
establish the relative experie.1ce of individual employers with unemployment 
or benefit costs . 
Massachusetts makes u s e of the benefit-1vage r atio plan, which is a 
modification of the "Texa s Plan 11 or the "Cl iffe Planu of experience rating . 
A fundamental difficulty with this formula and any formula based upon bene-
fits charged is the impossibility of allocatJing the responsibility for 
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unempl o:f!llent t o specific employers. Another difficulty encountered is the 
problem of what the primary function of experience rating should be . 
Should it be the a ttiainment of empl oyment stability or t he allocation of 
benefit costa? 
A genuine merit ratin~ system would measure the exact degree of 
regul ar empl oyment achjeved by a given empl oyer a s a re sult. of t he incentive 
tax . However , neither the merit ·atinu system in NiassachJ.setts nor those of 
any other states take into account the deg r ee of cont rol which the indi.vidu a.l 
employer has over the volume of employment and unemployment . Under mer_i_ t 
r:ating the injus t ries that are naturally stable receive the l ower tax rate !3 
and the industri es tho.t are naturally unstabl e receive the h:tghe r tax rate s. 
This situation ex_i_sts irrespective of any achievements made in giving more 
regular employment. This device of "letting t he ot:.her f ellow pay" i s called 
t. he ''allocation of social co.st. " 
There is a fundamental question of fi scal policy invol ved in the 
cont rove r sy concern.i.nr; merE rat.Lng. A yield of at l east 2. 7% has been 
considered necess<J.ry if we are to hu.ve a social ly adequate sy stem of une:n-
plo:rrnant i nsurance . &per ience rC~.ting; should not. be used as a device for an 
over- al l tax reduction . If some employers are to 5et a rate of .5% , yiel ds 
equal to 2. 7% wil l necessl.tata incr easinE; the ta..-x: on empl oyer s wi th an 
unfu.vorabl e expe rience consider ably .:1.bove 47b. .As a matter of fact, the 
allocation of cost theory , shoul d l o.sically , require that an employe r with 
a ad experience pay a rat:.e necessdr .}T to take care of unemploymen t occuring 
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in his particular enterprise. Sach a rate , carried to its logical extreme, 
might well be 7 or 8% in certain industrie s. 
VV"h ile admitting the value of regul a r ized emplo;ytnent within indi-
vidual plants , the social value of regula rized employment may be questioned 
on the general economic grounds that regularized employment tend s to create 
not only a group of regul a rly employed individuals but also a group of 
ind iv :L.duals who never have job s. Regularization also tends to reduce the 
number of jobs. &J penalizing employers whenever a worker draws benef i ts, 
employers are constrai ned to cut workin£~ fo r ces to a minimum and to delay 
expansion of e·,nployment . Also, any plan of expe r ience r a ting offers 
employers incent i ve s to reduce their taxes regardless of theu· re::;ulari-
zat ion of employment. Although t he &nticipated tax reduct ion vv-ill stimul ate 
r egul a r ization in some pl ants, there is littl e possibility that merit rating 
will result in changes in empl oynFmt pra ctice s thc:.t vvill significantly 
affect large portions of the l CJ.bor market in the long run. The great 
pressure of the bus ine s s cycle will continue to force expans i on or contra c-
tion of i n comes and jobs. 
It should be noted that there is great interdependence of i ndus - · .. 
tries , and any attempt to allocate responsibility to individual employers is 
futile . The risk of any su ch attempt is so severe that provision for bene-
fits can soundly be me de only by cornrnuni t ytwise sharing of the risk . 
The proponents of experience rating are overlooking the fact t hat 
unemployment i nsurance s erve s as a brake, in emergencies. The first stimulus 
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t ha t can be given at the start of a depre ssion i s a qui ck i ncrease in the 
nation 1 s purcha s ing pov er . .ll_ large reserve or benef i t paymen t pool under a 
socially adequat e unemployment ..i..nsurcJ.nce system coul d put several bil l ion 
dol lcJ.rs into circulation lon~ bef ore any pr ogram such a s pQblic works , for 
ex~n le, coul d even get into operation . 
Unempl oymEmt insurance and especial l y merit rat ing ar e appr oach..i.!1g 
the crisis which may :let ermine whethe r the syst em as i t now e" ist s can 
!\.t present , t!assachasett s is f a ced Wlvh a crisis becau s e of the 
dw ..i..ndl in_:; siz e of t:.he .Jnemplo~;-ment Compen s at i on Fund. ;,_s a re sult of t he 
small bal ance in the fund , ex1Jerience rdting has been tempor ari ly abolished . 
The dvfindl ing f u_ d has caused much concern and many reasons have been su.s -
I ested and many sol utions offe red conc e rning -v he situation . The Hbi.__, 
business interest s" in this state are attempt ing to l ay the bl a,.,_e on t:. he 
workers in an o.ttempt to keep themsel ve s in the background . B-y cl a i min3 
th<.Lt \:. he •~orkers have "chisell ed" from t he fund ; they hope to 6et a new 
unerr.pl oymen t insur-::~.nce l c..w that wil l cut •·orkers 1 benef ts an d permit a re-
instatem_nt of experience rat .l.ng . Empl oye r s have absur dl y cl aimed t hat the 
vvo rkers have "r obbedn the fund at the rat e of ;~~3 0 , 000 , 000 a year. This 
fugure is fanta stic when comtJared with the f 1.gure fo r e r roneous or fraud-
ulent pc:_,_yme t s published by the Divis ion of i;rripl oymen t Security . 
l!;'npl oyers of this state have ne~lected to mention t hdt they , them-
sel v-e s, have deprived ·he fund , viJ. experience rating , of appr oximately 
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~330 , 000 , 000 from 1942-1949. They al so sa.ved another $101, 000 , 000 during 
the same period dele to the ~~3,000 limit on wage s . So i t. can be seen t hat 
from 1942-49 empl oyers have "robbed" the fund of ~P43l ,OOO , 000 which is 
a} most t ·,·. ice the a.!lot..mt- of their total contributions for the same period of 
time . !Tad e u.pl oyers paid the s ame contribution rate as that for th United 
tates as a whole , the fund would be !~100 , 000 , 000 richer than it is now. 
The years 1 94 2-1949 we r e years of prosperity when employers co llld 
eas.Lly have afforded an icreased tax burden . However, this state retained 
experie-:1ce ratbg during that period althou.~h, ethical ::..y speaki ng , employer s 
did not deserve it. ~ nployers had done nothing to sta ilize employment. I t 
came about due to the shortage of l abor suppl y and increased dernand , espe-
cially by t he ;_;overnment . 
..!!npl oyers must remember that the structure of lndustrJ in Mass-
achllsett s doe s not permit the fund to be C.l.deq,J.ately .financed by experience 
rating. Unemplo7,1nent wi l l be higher here t han in other sections of the 
country. An attempt to cut into work rs ' bene.: .J..ts is no sol ution, for it 
does not attack the cause of t.he dilemma. Jnl e s3 the ~onomy of this state 
can be re-vi~al iz ed , experience ratin.:; must be abolished so that t.he f und 
..-dll be a de ::rHte to meet the claims of the unemployed . 
